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TORT ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEM OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL MENS REA*
ERIN L. SHELEY**
The respondeat superior (vicarious liability) standard, by which
courts hold corporations liable for the crimes of their employees,
has been widely criticized as being overinclusive insofar as it
punishes faultless entities. Less acknowledged is that, due to its
requirement that the employee intended in part to benefit the
corporation, the standard is also underinclusive in cases of sexual
violence facilitated by a corporate entity. This Article argues that,
to solve these corporate liability problems within criminal law,
we should learn from the parallel development of corporate
liability in the sphere of tort law, from which respondeat superior
was derived in the first place. No comprehensive effort has yet
been made to examine how courts have, in tort respondeat
superior,
addressed
the
problems
of
overand
underinclusiveness that emerge in that realm. In light of the
lessons revealed in tort case law, I argue that criminal respondeat
superior should apply where the government can show (1) a
crime occurred, regardless of whether or not any individual
employee had the intent to benefit the corporation; (2) an
omission by the corporation to take reasonable steps to prevent
the crime; and (3) the substantial risk of such a crime was
objectively foreseeable to a reasonable person undertaking the
corporation’s enterprise.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 774
I.
ENTITY LIABILITY AND ITS CRITICS ......................................... 779
A. The Legal Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability ....... 780
B. Criticisms of Respondeat Superior ....................................... 784

* © 2019 Erin L. Sheley.
** Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I am indebted to
Laura Appleman, Miriam Baer, Stephanie Barclay, Emily Bremer, Cynthia Godsoe,
Carissa Hessick, Kristin Hickman, Eric Johnson, Kit Johnson, David Kwok, Christopher
Odinet, Marah McLeod, Julia Mahoney, Irina Manta, Roger Michalski, Melissa
Mortazavi, Lee Otis, Will Thomas, Robin Wilson, and the participants in faculty
workshops at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pittsburgh for their invaluable
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019)

774

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

1. The Case that Respondeat Superior Punishes Too
Much .................................................................................. 785
2. The Case that Respondeat Superior Punishes Too
Little .................................................................................. 787
C. Alternative Theories ............................................................... 788
D. The Interaction of Respondeat Superior and the Federal
Criminal Code ........................................................................ 794
II.
THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE ............................. 796
A. The Requirement that the Crime Benefit the Employer ..... 796
B. Corporate Sex Crimes ............................................................ 802
C. Corporate Homicide .............................................................. 809
III. TORT ANSWERS ............................................................................ 812
A. The Purposes of Respondeat Superior in Tort and
Criminal Law ......................................................................... 812
B. Common Law Refinements of Respondeat Superior ......... 817
1. Unintentional Torts and Overinclusiveness ................. 818
2. Intentional Torts and Underinclusiveness .................... 822
C. The Project of Doctrinal Borrowing .................................... 825
IV. A NEW STANDARD ...................................................................... 827
A. A Crime, Regardless of Intent to Benefit ............................. 830
B. The Omission of Reasonable Steps to Prevent the
Crime....................................................................................... 830
C. The Objective Foreseeability of the Crime .......................... 831
D. Examples................................................................................. 834
1. The Rogue Bid Rigger .................................................... 834
2. Collective Fault ................................................................ 835
3. The Sexually Abusive Doctor ........................................ 835
4. The Unforeseeable Offense ........................................... 836
5. Corporate Homicide........................................................ 836
6. The Deliveryman Rapist ................................................. 837
E. Counterarguments .................................................................. 838
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 840
INTRODUCTION
The concept of mens rea has had something of a political
moment over the past few years. A rare bipartisan effort to reform
the Federal Criminal Code, which would have, among other things,
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relaxed mandatory minimums in sentencing,1 failed recently due to
disagreement over its “mens rea reform” provision.2 The proposed
bill would have amended the Federal Criminal Code to provide that,
“the Government [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted . . . willfully, with respect to any element for which
the text of the covered offense does not specify a state of mind.”3
Supporters of the provision note that the massive Federal Criminal
Code4 and the broad discretion it already allows prosecutors5 has
grown even more threatening to the morally innocent due to the low
mens rea standards that distinguish federal criminal law from its state
counterparts.6 They argue that, due to the size and complexity of the
Federal Criminal Code, the absence of a mens rea requirement
increases the likelihood that people will be convicted without having
known or reasonably anticipated that they were violating criminal
law.7
Opponents of this provision, however, argue that requiring a
mens rea element of willfulness would essentially render offenders
immune from liability for reckless or grossly negligent conduct.8 The
federal government currently prosecutes conduct such as fraud,
environmental offenses, and other common white-collar crimes that
1. Justin George, Can Bipartisan Criminal-Justice Reform Survive in the Trump
Era?, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/canbipartisan-criminal-justice-reform-survive-in-the-trump-era [https://perma.cc/WJ8D-LMFD].
2. See Matt Apuzzo & Eric Lipton, Rare White House Accord with Koch Brothers on
Sentencing Frays, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/
politics/rare-alliance-of-libertarians-and-white-house-on-sentencing-begins-to-fray.html
[https://perma.cc/258B-GZYJ (dark archive)] (discussing disagreement over the bill).
3. Mens Rea Reform Act of 2015, S. 2298, 114th Cong. § 28(b) (2015).
4. While over 4000 criminal statutes exist, that number does not include the
countless other federal “crimes” created by administrative agencies. See Julie Rose
O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code”: Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 57, 57–58 (2014).
5. Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1107, 1119–
21; see also O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 60, 62–63.
6. Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal
Law: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 14–15 (2013) (prepared statement of Dr. John S. Baker, Jr., Visiting
Professor, Georgetown Law School); cf. O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 62–63 (providing the
example of honest services fraud).
7. See John G. Malcolm, The Pressing Need for Mens Rea Reform, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/the-pressingneed-mens-rea-reform [https://perma.cc/VLK2-82GD] (stating that “innocent mistakes or
accidents can become crimes” if there is a lack of adequate or any mens rea requirement).
8. See Zach Carter, House Bill Would Make It Harder to Prosecute White-Collar
Crime, HUFFPOST (Nov. 16, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/whitecollar-crime-prosecution_us_564a2336e4b06037734a2f84 [https://perma.cc/VK63-RYQL].
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already lack a specified mens rea requirement.9 Officials in the
Department of Justice under the Obama administration contended
that the legislation “would make it significantly harder to prosecute
corporate polluters, producers of tainted food and other white-collar
criminals.”10
The fact that a dispute over mens rea for white-collar offenses
derailed what would have been a historic bipartisan effort at criminal
justice reform underscores the political fault lines around the question
of how corporate crime fits into our traditional understandings of
punishment. To oversimplify the situation into a crude dichotomy: the
outcome of the reform effort suggests that liberals wish to maintain a
broad swath of potential criminal liability for white-collar offenders,
while conservatives wish to reduce the overall amount of criminal
liability for regulatory offenses, including white-collar offenses. In
other words, views on the current federal enforcement of white-collar
crime seem to have eclipsed common ground on drug offenses and
other areas more commonly affecting individual offenders.
The sudden political stakes of white-collar mens rea urge that we
revisit a narrower question that is well trodden but unresolved in the
scholarly literature: When should a corporation be held liable as an
entity for the crimes its employees committed? The current standard,
announced by the Supreme Court in 1909 and unchanged since then,
imports the concept of respondeat superior from tort law: employers
are vicariously liable for all of the crimes of their employees
committed within the scope of their employment, without any
showing of corporate fault.11 Critics of this corporate liability standard
make nearly identical arguments to those of the low mens rea
standards in the Federal Criminal Code: it offends the notion that
criminal culpability tracks with moral guilt,12 it overdeters commercial
conduct through its vagueness and lack of predictability,13 and its

9. See Apuzzo & Lipton, supra note 2; Carter, supra note 8.
10. Apuzzo & Lipton, supra note 2.
11. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909).
12. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2009); see also William S.
Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 655 (1994); Gerhard
O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position
on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 41–46 (1957).
13. See generally Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing that corporate criminal liability results in overdeterrence).
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overbreadth allows prosecutors unfettered discretion to shape
criminal justice through charging decisions.14
In this Article, I take seriously the overbreadth critique of the
respondeat superior standard for corporate criminal liability. In
addition to the well-known issues of overbreadth, I identify a
significant area in which criminal respondeat superior—at both state
and federal levels—is underinclusive. Specifically, the current
requirement that an employee must intend to benefit the corporation
has the effect of shielding even reckless or knowing corporate
employers from liability in the very worst criminal cases: those of
physical and sexual violence by employees committed in connection
with their employment. Ironically, while the overbreadth of corporate
criminal liability offends the core aim of criminal punishment, so too
does its underbreadth. Morally innocent corporations may be
punished while prosecutors are unable to punish some of the most
morally guilty.
This Article argues that, to solve these problems within the
criminal law, we should learn from their parallel development in the
sphere of tort law. Respondeat superior was, after all, a tort doctrine
in the first place. Yet no comprehensive comparative effort has been
made to examine how courts have, in tort respondeat superior,
addressed the problems of over- and underinclusiveness that are
nearly as pervasive in that realm and apply those lessons to criminal
law. Here, I apply the judicial and theoretical developments in tort
respondeat superior to the purposes of corporate criminal law and
offer a new standard for corporate criminal liability.
This analysis starts with a comparison of the purposes and
functions of tort and criminal law, which have similar competing
goals. Just as criminal jurisprudence has been plagued by conflict
between utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment,15 the
traditional instrumentalist view of tort law as motivated by either
deterrence or risk spreading has faced a significant challenge by the
“rights-based” account, which turns on the duties of one person to
another.16 Yet the particular tort goal of risk spreading—which courts

14. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1045–
48 (2008); Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414–15, 427 (2007).
15. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307–08 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. See CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 689 (1959) (claiming that “[t]he central policy issue in tort law is whether the
principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or on a wide distribution of
risk and loss”); Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV.
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regularly cite as the justification for strict liability doctrines such as
respondeat superior—applies far less clearly to criminal law, which
generally prioritizes the redress of public harm over making a victim
whole. This in and of itself argues against a system of pure vicarious
criminal liability for faultless corporations.
Tort case law suggests mechanisms for refining the concept of
corporate criminal fault. In cases where respondeat superior might be
potentially overinclusive—specifically, cases of unintentional torts by
employees—the common law tempers its harshness. Unlike in
criminal law, with its vast array of statutory strict liability offenses,
tort law’s background principles of negligence make it nearly
impossible for a faultless corporation to be on the hook for the
actions of a faultless employee.17 In addition, we see foreseeability
doctrines emerging in the case law, imposing liability only where
harm is typical of a particular commercial enterprise.18 This strongly
suggests that criminal respondeat superior can be profitably modified
by some form of negligence requirement.
On the flip side, courts have also dealt with the potential
underinclusiveness of respondeat superior in the tort context in cases
where plaintiffs sue employers for the sexual misconduct of their
employees. Recovery in these cases was once greatly limited by
courts’ refusal to hold entities liable for the intentional torts of their
employees, on the theory that such torts could not have benefitted the
corporation.19 Yet, over time, courts have increasingly replaced the
intent-to-benefit requirement with a form of causation analysis,
asking whether there was a nexus between the assailant’s employment
and the harm to the victim.20
In light of these lessons, I argue that criminal respondeat
superior should apply where the government can show (1) a crime
occurred, regardless of whether or not any individual employee had
the intent to benefit the corporation; (2) an omission by the
corporation to take reasonable steps to prevent the crime; and (3) the
substantial risk of such a crime was objectively foreseeable to a
reasonable person undertaking the corporation’s enterprise. Criminal
negligence standards already exist throughout the law. Developing

271, 273 (2012) (arguing that “tort law doctrines may need to satisfy both instrumental and
rights-based concerns in order to be stable and persistent”).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 239–47.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 267–70.
19. See infra Section III.B.2.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 270–80.
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such a standard for corporate criminal mens rea makes sense given
the tort foundations of respondeat superior.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the state of
criminal respondeat superior and its substantial critical literature,
including the most significant alternative proposals. Part II argues
that, in addition to creating the much-lamented overbreadth
problems, the current law of criminal respondeat superior likewise
underpunishes in cases of what I call “corporate violence.” Part III
presents the lessons to be learned from the theory and common law
of respondeat superior in tort law. Part IV incorporates these tort
developments into a new, better-tailored standard for corporate
criminal liability.
I. ENTITY LIABILITY AND ITS CRITICS
As far back as the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV
articulated what has come to be known as the “‘fiction’ theory” of the
corporation when he described ecclesiastical bodies as both distinct
entities as a matter of social fact and personae fictae—lacking a body
or will and thus not susceptible to excommunication.21 Over the past
200 years, legal theorists have clashed over two views of the
fundamental nature of a corporation.22 Corporate realism holds that a
corporation’s legal personality is actually a manifestation of its real
personality in society.23 Corporate nominalism holds that a
corporation is simply a contractual arrangement amongst individual
shareholders.24 While corporate nominalism lost ground in the 1920s,
it has been revived more recently with the contractual theory of the
firm, a descendant of corporate nominalism, which defines
corporations as “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among individuals.”25 The question of
whether a corporation should be criminally liable separate from its
employees turns to some extent on which of these views we take to be
more accurate. Can a network of contracts legitimately be said to
have independent moral agency such that it should receive the
21. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655, 665–66 (1926); Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The
Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J.
COMP. L. 583, 584 (1999).
22. See Iwai, supra note 21, at 583–84.
23. See id. at 584.
24. Id.
25. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976)
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted); see also Iwai, supra note 21, at 584–85.
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denunciative sanction of the criminal law? U.S. courts have answered
this question in the affirmative.26 In so doing, however, they have
created a loose and highly controversial doctrine of entity liability
that has bedeviled scholars and practitioners alike for over a century.
A. The Legal Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability
In 1909, in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United
States,27 the Supreme Court expressly abandoned the rule that
corporations could not be held criminally liable.28 At issue in that case
was whether it was constitutional for Congress to hold entities liable
for violating the Elkins Act, which amended the Interstate Commerce
Act to criminalize both parties to an arrangement where shippers
demanded and received rebates from railroad companies in restraint
of trade.29 The Court concluded that the law “cannot shut its eyes to
the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern
times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that
interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands.”30 The Court
found that allowing corporations continued immunity from
prosecution “would virtually take away the only means of effectually
controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”31
Even the Court’s recognition of corporate criminal liability,
which it declared was “in the interest of public policy,”32 has been
described as a burst of “judicial activism.”33 The means the Court
chose to accomplish this, however, have been even more
controversial. It merely imported the tort doctrine of respondeat
superior into the criminal law, holding that both the actus reus and
mens rea of any individual employee acting within the scope of his or
her authority could be attributed to the corporation, even when acting
“against [the corporation’s] express orders.”34 Courts subsequently
elaborated on this standard in two significant ways. First, the
employee must act, at least partially, for the purposes of benefitting
26. See infra Section I.A.
27. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
28. Id. at 492–96.
29. Id. at 491–92 (citing Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903), repealed by Hepburn
Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906)).
30. Id. at 495.
31. Id. at 495–96.
32. Id. at 494.
33. Philip A. Lacovara & David P. Nicoli, Vicarious Criminal Liability of
Organizations: RICO as an Example of a Flawed Principle in Practice, 64 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 725, 733 (1990).
34. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 493–96.
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the corporation (a requirement that is not ironclad in respondeat
superior doctrine under tort law).35 Second, an employee need only
have apparent authority to act on behalf of the corporation, which is
met where a third party reasonably believes the agent has the
authority to perform the act in question.36
Respondeat superior was not the inevitable standard for
corporate criminal liability. Six years after the Court decided New
York Central, the House of Lords addressed a similar issue in a 1915
case called Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.37 but did
not apply the doctrine of respondeat superior. While this was a civil
case, the court created a standard for entity liability that became the
touchstone for criminal cases in the United Kingdom, and it remains
so, with a few exceptions, to this day.38 In Lennard’s Carrying,
Viscount Haldane announced the so-called directing mind test, also
known as the identification test, for entity liability:
A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any
more than it has a body of its own. Its active and directing will
must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who
for some purposes may be called the agent, but is really the
directing mind and will of the corporation, the alter ego and
centre of the personality of the corporation. That person may
be under the direction of the shareholders in general meeting.
That person may be the board of directors itself, or it may be,
and in some companies it is so, that that person has an authority
co-ordinate with that of the board of directors, given to him
under the articles of association, and, being appointed by the
general meeting of the company, he can only be removed by the
general meeting of the company.39

35. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963);
infra Section II.A.
36. See United States v. Great Am. Ins. of N.Y., 738 F.3d 1320, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[L]iability may
attach without proof that the conduct was within the agent’s actual authority . . . .”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Apparent authority
is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third
parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of
the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”).
37. [1915] KB 1281 (Eng.).
38. See Neil Cavanagh, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Assessment of the Models of
Fault, 75 J. CRIM. L. 414, 416 (2011) (“Under the common law, the identification doctrine
has been the primary method employed to attribute criminal liability to a corporation. The
identification doctrine originates from the civil law case of Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd[.]
v[.] Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.”).
39. Lennard’s Carrying, [1915] KB at 1284.
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In other words, unlike simple respondeat superior, the directing mind
test requires that the prosecution identify a particular employee
whose stature in the corporation is significant enough that he or she
can be said to represent the “ego” of the organization. It is that
person’s mens rea that can be imputed to the corporation for the
purposes of establishing corporate criminal intent. Canadian courts
adopted this standard in criminal cases, until a Parliamentary
intervention in this century,40 with the additional feature that there
could be more than one directing mind within a corporation.41
Despite the novelty and fairly dramatic new world order
announced in New York Central, the Supreme Court has not since
weighed in substantively on the essence of corporate criminal liability.
This has left lower courts with the unenviable task of figuring out how
to apply the respondeat superior standard to the vast range of
potential criminal offenses and across the spectrum of fault
requirements. For criminal offenses with a scienter element—a
showing of subjective fault by the offender—a straightforward
application of respondeat superior would leave a corporation liable if
any individual employee possessed the requisite degree of fault.
However, because this seems inconsistent with the presumption of
fault as a precondition to criminal liability, some federal courts have
declined to impute an employee’s subjective fault to the corporate
employer without evidence that management in some way knew
about or acquiesced to the misconduct.42
In contrast, another doctrinal puzzle arises when no single
employee possesses the requisite mens rea necessary for the offense
but a number of employees have, together, committed the unlawful
act. In these cases, a minority of courts have applied the so-called
collective knowledge doctrine, in which they aggregate the knowledge
of all of the employees to create the necessary scienter.43 The leading
case on collective knowledge is United States v. Bank of New England,
N.A.,44 in which a bank was charged with violating the Currency
40. See Peter MacKay, Corporate Liability in Canada, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS,
https://globalcompliancenews.com/white-collar-crime/corporate-liability-canada/ [https://perma.cc/
3TWA-6Z8Y].
41. See, e.g., Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, 693
(Can.).
42. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 2.07[A] (4th
ed. 2017).
43. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8.21, at
531–32 (3d ed. 2010); see also United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738
(W.D. Va. 1974).
44. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Transaction Reporting Act (“CTRA”) by failing to report cash
transfers greater than $10,000.45 To be liable under the CTRA, a
defendant must “willful[ly]” commit the violation, a mens rea element
that other courts have held requires “proof of the defendant’s
knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to
commit the crime.”46 The court noted that “[w]illfulness can rarely be
proven by direct evidence, since it is a state of mind,” but “is usually
established by drawing reasonable inferences from the available
facts.”47 On thirty-one separate occasions, Bank of New England
tellers cashed checks to the same customer that added up to a sum
greater than $10,000.48 While each individual check valued less than
$10,000, on each of the thirty-one occasions the individual checks
were presented simultaneously to a single bank teller and valued
more than $10,000 in aggregate.49 Dismissing the bank’s argument
that the compartmentalized nature of knowledge within the
corporation shielded it from liability, the court upheld the
corporation’s conviction based on the collective knowledge of its
disparate employees.50
The collective knowledge approach has been criticized by courts
and commentators alike for essentially imposing the unrealistic
requirement that senior management keep track of the knowledge of
all of its employees.51 As the Fifth Circuit observed when declining to
consider the collective knowledge of all corporate officers in
determining scienter under the Securities and Exchange Act,
where, as in fraud, an essentially subjective state of mind is an
element of a cause of action also involving some sort of
conduct, such as a misrepresentation, the required state of mind

45. Id. at 846–47.
46. United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1580 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984)).
47. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 854 (citing United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12,
20 (1st Cir. 1985)).
48. Id. at 847–48.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 856.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1275 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), vacating in part, 653 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2009); Thomas A. Hagemann &
Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction,
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 238–39 (1997); cf. In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F.
Supp. 1293, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing “the imputation of every bit of knowledge
known to each individual employee” and instead requiring both that the employee have
learned the information in the course of an employment-related activity and that the
employee be of a “sufficient level of corporate responsibility to justify charging the
corporation with that knowledge” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 995 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1993).
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must actually exist in the individual making . . . the
misrepresentation, and may not simply be imputed to that
individual on general principles of agency.52
With even the courts at odds as to how exactly to apply criminal
respondeat superior, it is unsurprising that the doctrine has attracted
extensive criticism.
B.

Criticisms of Respondeat Superior

Before addressing the particular criticisms of the respondeat
superior standard itself, there is a preliminary question of whether it
is appropriate for corporate criminal liability to exist in the first place.
Detractors argue that criminally punishing an entity violates all three
of the general purposes of criminal punishment: retribution,
deterrence, and rehabilitation. For example, John Hasnas
characterizes vicarious liability as, inherently, the punishment of
innocents—in this case shareholders, stakeholders, and other
employees—which he argues is incompatible with the retributive
principle of punishing no more and no less than what is deserved.53
Some empirical literature also suggests that corporate criminal
liability—which obviously cannot result in imprisonment but only
fines—may inefficiently overdeter misconduct relative to existing
administrative and civil sanctions.54 In light of these problems, Miriam
Baer has proposed an insurance system to replace criminal liability, in
which insurance carriers would review a company’s compliance
programs, use a number of factors to estimate the likelihood that its
employees would commit crimes, and then charge the company for
insurance on that basis.55
Supporters of corporate criminal liability point to the sheer
amount of harm corporations can cause,56 as well as the expressive
value, from the moral perspective of the general public, of punishing

52. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).
53. See Hasnas, supra note 12, at 1339; see also Laufer, supra note 12, at 655; Mueller,
supra note 12, at 41–46. Hasnas also argues that, whatever the benefits of corporate
criminal liability in terms of deterrence or rehabilitation, they can only be justified by
punishing guilty parties, not innocents. Hasnas, supra note 12, at 1339–40.
54. See generally Fischel & Sykes, supra note 13 (arguing against corporate criminal
liability and in favor of appropriate civil remedies); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing that civil
liability avoids the undesirable consequences of corporate criminal liability).
55. Baer, supra note 14, at 1035, 1079–81.
56. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2009).
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corporations in addition to their constituents.57 Others draw upon the
recent scholarship on the “utility of desert” to suggest that if social
norms support criminal liability for corporations, we risk
delegitimizing the criminal law by failing to impose it.58 Elsewhere I
have defended the existence of corporate criminal liability under
certain circumstances on the grounds that when a corporation
commits a crime it imposes a unique set of harms on its victims that
flow from the nature of the corporate structure itself.59 I contend that
it is appropriate, retributively, for criminal law to redress the
increased psychological and cultural harms related to a corporation’s
enduring nature and institutional connections with state power.60
Redressing this harm is an important function of criminal punishment
that cannot be attained by civil penalties alone. We may also reap
additional expressive benefits from redressing such harm, though I
argue that expressive benefits alone cannot justify punishment in the
absence of actual harm.61
A new deep dive on this question is, however, beyond the scope
of this Article. It is also not terribly pressing given that, whatever its
theoretical challenges, some form of corporate criminal liability is
likely here to stay.62 The bases for critics’ objections to its mere
existence remain relevant to the second question: Is respondeat
superior the appropriate standard for determining when corporations
should be liable for the crimes of their agents?
1. The Case that Respondeat Superior Punishes Too Much
The most common argument against respondeat superior is that
it exacerbates the problems of justice already inherent in vicarious
criminal liability by overly broadening the range of employee conduct
that can be attributed to the entity.63 Under a theory of respondeat
57. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609, 618–22 (1998).
58. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND.
L.J. 473, 521 (2006).
59. Erin Sheley, Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225,
259–63 (2012).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 238.
62. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612 (2012)
(“[C]orporate punishment is not likely to yield to corporate regulation any time soon. The
public has increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate
governance scandals. Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive motivations and therefore
supports those institutions best poised to take advantage of such motivations.”).
63. See Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational Incentives to Care About the Law, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer & Autumn 1997, at 45 (“[I]n the absence of complicity at
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superior, one rogue, low-level employee acting against company
policy—and even against specific instruction—can bring criminal
liability down upon the entire operation, even for criminal offenses
that require the defendant to act knowingly or willfully.64 If the notion
of corporate “intent” makes sense at all, it seems illogical to infer it
from the individual intent of one rogue employee.
These theoretical problems of overbreadth have become
exacerbated in practice. Prosecutors have a significant amount of
leverage in the criminal justice system generally, usually due to an
asymmetry of resources vis-à-vis individual defendants. But in the
case of corporations, prosecutorial leverage is due in large part to the
devastating market consequences of an indictment.65 This leverage,
combined with such a broad liability standard as respondeat superior,
which precludes as it does any hope of arguing lack of corporate mens
rea, leaves corporations with so little chance of success at trial that
they have little incentive to test the government’s case.
This state of affairs gave rise to the popularity of the deferred
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) as a means of resolving federal
corporate criminal investigations.66 In a deferred prosecution
agreement—which, unlike a plea bargain, is not subject to judicial
implementation—the government agrees not to prosecute the
corporation in exchange for various financial penalties and
investigative cooperation, a practice which has been widely described
as requiring the corporation to be “agents of the state.”67 There is at

high levels, vicarious liability often taxes the corporation and its shareholders with the
consequences of conduct that the corporation itself has prohibited.”); Laufer, supra note
12, at 655–56; Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1319–20 (2007).
64. See United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A]
corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its
employees . . . even if, as in Hilton Hotels and American Radiator, such acts were against
corporate policy or express instructions.”); see also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970).
65. See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1481, 1483 (2007); Weissmann, supra note 63, at 1321. It is worth noting that the degree of
the adverse market reaction to an indictment appears to vary depending on the crime
alleged: among fraud offenses, for example, financial reporting offenses see the largest
stock drops, fraud offenses against the government second, fraud offenses against
stakeholders third, and fraud offenses involving regulatory violations showing little effect.
See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate
Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 412 (1991).
66. See Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 65, at 1481–84.
67. Id. at 1481.
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least some evidence that federal prosecutors have started to abuse
this power. Recently, a series of corporate defendants in Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) cases made the unusual decision to
take their cases to trial rather than cooperate.68 These trials revealed
instances of the DOJ and FBI resorting to improper tactics to make
their cases in the absence of the cooperation attained through a
DPA.69
2. The Case that Respondeat Superior Punishes Too Little
While the lion’s share of criticisms of respondeat superior relate
to the excessive amount of criminal exposure it leaves corporations,
there are circumstances under which it can also be underinclusive.
Given the size and complexity of the modern corporation, it is often
difficult to keep track of what employee is making what decision at
68. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that the present case was “the first Foreign Corrupt Practices Act criminal
prosecution against a corporation to proceed to jury trial”); Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers, FCPA Case: U.S. v. Goncalves (Gun Sting Case), CRIM. DEF. ISSUES,
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=23896 [https://perma.cc/6PVF-QQWM].
69. The conviction of Lindsey Manufacturing Company, the first corporation to stand
trial under the FCPA, was subsequently overturned by a federal judge who noted that
the Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully before the
grand jury, inserted material falsehoods into affidavits submitted to magistrate
judges in support of applications for search warrants and seizure warrants,
improperly reviewed e-mail communications between one Defendant and her
lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery obligations, posed questions
to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings, engaged in questionable
behavior during closing argument and even made misrepresentations to the Court.
Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. In the case of the so-called Africa Sting operation, the
government drafted notorious con man Richard Bistrong to make cases against twentytwo executives and employees in the military and law enforcement products industry for
engaging in a scheme to pay bribes to the defense minister of an African country. See
Richard L. Cassin, Where is Richard Bistrong Today?, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012, 5:28 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/10/31/where-is-richard-bistrong-today.html [https://perma.cc/
FS58-YY54]. While dismissing the charges against the defendants, the judge, who had
earlier expressed concerns about how the case was being prosecuted, said, “This appears
to be the end of a long chapter in the annals of white collar criminal enforcement.” Africa
Sting—in the Words of Judge Leon, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/africa-sting-in-the-words-of-judge-leon/ [https://perma.cc/CWR5JZZP]; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 68. Two weeks into the
trial of Joseph Sigelman, a former co-CEO of PetroTiger who had been accused of
conspiring to pay bribes to a former worker at Colombia’s state-owned Ecopetrol SA in
exchange for a contract, a chief witness against him recanted. Ex-PetroTiger Co-CEO
Avoids Prison in Bribery Case, REUTERS (June 16, 2015, 3:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/petrotiger-sigelman/ex-petrotiger-co-ceo-avoids-prison-in-bribery-case-idUSL1N0Z21U
U20150616 [https://perma.cc/U644-DCFB]. Sigelman took a plea and did not receive any jail
time. Id.
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any given time.70 Because respondeat superior requires that some
employee have the requisite mens rea while committing the requisite
actus reus, it may be impossible to find such a person—either as an
evidentiary matter or because, particularly for crimes that require
some heightened mental element of intent or knowledge, such a
person literally does not exist despite the fact that a crime has actually
occurred.71 Particularly in cases involving specific-intent offenses
where multiple employees appear guilty, each of whose potential guilt
casts doubt on the guilt of the others, a corporate defendant may be
able to obtain a so-called patchwork verdict where jurors agree that
the accused has done something illegal but do not agree upon which
of several distinct acts have occurred.72
As mentioned above, some courts developed the doctrine of
collective knowledge to adapt respondeat superior to deal with such
situations, but the majority have rejected it.73 And, in any case, the
doctrine fails to account for how to assign liability in cases requiring
specific intent above and beyond knowledge—what can be done
where multiple employees responsible for partial portions of the actus
reus have conflicting intents?74
C.

Alternative Theories

In the face of this morass, commentators have developed a range
of alternative mens rea standards for corporate criminal liability,
intended to impart coherence to the field. Many of them would
improve the status quo, but most suffer from at least one or another
practical or theoretical flaw. This section briefly describes the most
significant proposed alternatives.
Identification Theory. The oldest and most historically
established alternative to respondeat superior, identification theory,
70. Cf. Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter,
2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 107 (discussing the difficulty of “locat[ing] the single guilty
agent or the constellation of guilt in the corporation”).
71. See id.
72. See Stacey Neumann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts
and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (2004). For an
example of a patchwork verdict, see United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 455–56 (5th
Cir. 1977) (reversing the trial court’s instruction to a jury that concurrence on facts was
unnecessary so long as each juror found that the defendant had committed either one or
the other of two charged acts constituting “selling or receiving” a stolen vehicle).
73. See text accompanying notes 43–52; see also Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note
51, at 227 (noting that “only a few courts addressing criminal or civil issues have alluded to
the collective knowledge rule” (footnotes omitted)).
74. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049,
2071 (2016).
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remains the law of the land in the United Kingdom for most cases of
corporate crime that do not involve death.75 The American Law
Institute has also endorsed it in the Model Penal Code, under which a
corporation may be held criminally liable if “the commission of the
offense was authorized . . . by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent.”76 The problem with identification theory is that it
does not capture the internal reality of the large, modern corporation
and makes it too difficult to punish corporations where pervasive
wrongdoing cannot be traced to the specific knowledge of one highranking official.
In Canada, the gross negligence of Curragh Resources Inc., the
private company that managed the Westray coal mine, and its
political supporters resulted in the deaths of twenty-six Nova Scotia
miners in 1992.77 After the Crown’s failure to obtain any criminal
convictions, widespread public outcry resulted in Parliament
supplanting common law identification theory with a statutory
provision intended to make it easier to convict corporations.78 During
the parliamentary debates over what was then called Bill C-45, critics
of identification theory pointed out that “[r]arely do high-level
corporate officials personally engage in the specific conduct or make
the specific decisions that result in [workplace disasters].”79 Instead,
through policy decisions or cultural habit, they maintain a corporate
environment where subordinates feel encouraged or expected to cut
corners on compliance, in spite of the existence of compliance
policies.80 It is also easy to see how, if identification theory were the
law of the land, corporations could avoid liability for any subjectivefault crime simply by shielding their top brass from actual knowledge
of the relevant goings-on, like organized criminal syndicates.
Genuine Corporate Fault. A number of proposed models of
corporate liability attempt to replace vicarious liability with efforts to
define fault through features of the corporate form.81 One variant,
75. See Cavanagh, supra note 38, at 416–17, 421.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
77. Westray Remembered: Explosion Killed 26 N.S. Coal Miners in 1992, CBC (May 8,
2012, 3:18 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/westray-remembered-explosionkilled-26-n-s-coal-miners-in-1992-1.1240122 [https://perma.cc/B9DB-T32N].
78. See id.
79. DAVID GOETZ, PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH BRANCH, LS-457E, BILL C-45: AN
ACT TO AMEND THE CRIMINAL CODE (CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS) 2
(2003), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bdp-lop/ls/YM32-3-372-C45-eng.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XT6E-HFYA].
80. Id.
81. William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants
of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1307 (2000).
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proactive corporate fault, “attributes liability where a corporation’s
practices and procedures are inadequate to prevent the commission of
a crime.”82 Another, reactive corporate fault, focuses on the failure of
the corporation to respond adequately to a criminal offense after it
has been discovered.83 Both of these models violate the basic concept
of mens rea. While they focus on actual “corporate” conduct rather
than the acts of an employee, they measure fault with respect to acts
other than the actual actus reus of the offense (namely, ex ante
creation of policies or ex post investigation and remedies).
Another variant of the genuine corporate fault school is Peter
French’s theory of the Corporate Internal Decision Structure (“CID
Structure”).84 French has identified the CID Structure—the
combination of an organizational structure and formal corporate
policies—as the appropriate proxy for actual corporate
intentionality.85 According to French, “Corporate agency resides in
the possibility of CID Structure licensed redescription of events as
corporate intentional.”86 In other words, actions that appear
authorized by the CID Structure can truly be said to be willed by the
corporation as a whole. While French’s CID Structure theory works
well to justify the possibility of corporate intentionality against its
various critics (i.e., it does describe a mechanism by which corporate
intentionality, above and beyond the disparate intents of individual
employees, can be identified), it is a bit thin as an actual liability
standard. If we limit corporate criminal liability only to those offenses
where some intention can be identified through formal corporate
structure and policy, we are narrowing the scope of corporate
criminal law to the point of ineffectiveness. Crimes uncontemplated
by formal policy happen all the time. CID Structure as a liability
standard also suffers from some of the same problems as
identification theory in the sense that those responsible for crafting
formal policies may nonetheless be willfully ignorant of, or even
encouraging of, deviations from them.
Compliance Program / Safe Harbor. One of the easier-toadminister alternatives to pure respondeat superior would be
retaining the current vicarious liability standard but allowing some

82. Id.
83. See id. at 1308.
84. See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207,
211–15 (1979).
85. Id. at 212.
86. Id. at 215.
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sort of affirmative defense based on the corporation’s good faith.87
For example, Ellen Podgor has proposed that corporations should be
able to use evidence of a compliance program as part of a good faith
defense.88 She notes that this would avoid punishing innocent
shareholders when the corporation itself could be shown to have had
compliance programs in place to avoid the misconduct (presumably
also creating incentives for corporations to continue to implement
these programs).89 Another variant of this idea would require the
government to prove the lack of bona fide compliance program as
part of its affirmative case.90 For example, Andrew Weissman and
David Newman have proposed a form of negligence standard that
requires proof of a “fail[ure] to have reasonably effective policies and
procedures to prevent the conduct.”91 This proposal would create a
beneficial limitation on prosecutorial discretion but has been
criticized for creating a vague standard of liability that would
generate confusion and overdeterrence.92 Another downside to all of
these theories is that allowing a safe harbor for liability could
incentivize corporations to create “paper” compliance programs
behind which misconduct occurs under the table. It would be,
essentially, a dodge for evaluating actual mens rea.
Corporate Ethos. Like the safe harbor model, a corporate ethos
theory of corporate criminal liability also considers the existence of a
compliance program, but as part of a broader inquiry into corporate
culture generally. Australia, for example, allows proof of corporate
intent or recklessness through evidence that “a corporate culture
existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated
or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision.”93 The leading
87. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 462–64 (1993); see also H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal
Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV.
279, 309–12 (1995).
88. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith”
Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2007) (“[A]n affirmative defense
should be offered to those who present ‘good faith’ efforts to achieve compliance with the
law as demonstrated in their corporate compliance program.”).
89. See id. at 1543.
90. See Weissmann, supra note 63, at 1322; Weissmann with Newman, supra note 14,
at 440 (dismissing concerns about “paper” compliance programs as unrealistic because,
“[f]or a company to succeed at such a ruse, it would need to implement an inadequate
program, pass it off as sufficient, not otherwise be subject to criminal liability because of
the pervasiveness of the criminal conduct at issue which would undermine establishing the
adequacy of any program, and fool prosecutors, the court, and jurors”).
91. Weismann with Newman, supra note 14, at 414.
92. Baer, supra note 14, at 1074.
93. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 3 ch 2 div 12.3(2)(c) (Austl.).
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American proponent of corporate ethos theory, Pamela Bucy, urges a
similar rule: conviction should result only where the government
“proves that the corporate ethos encouraged agents of the
corporation to commit the criminal act.”94 Aspects of ethos that Bucy
considers include hierarchical structure, corporate goals, post-offense
behavior, and the existence of a compliance program.95 The most
immediately apparent problem with corporate ethos theory is that
showing causation would seem to present evidentiary issues. Even
with Bucy’s specific criteria, it is hard to pinpoint a direct causal link
between something as diffuse as “culture” and a specific instance of
wrongdoing. Mihailis Diamantis has pointed out that if only evidence
of culture as a generalized contributing cause were sufficient, then the
case would run afoul of the evidentiary prohibition against character
evidence used to show a propensity to commit a crime.96
Constructive Corporate Fault. William Laufer has proposed
perhaps the most nuanced mechanism for assigning criminal liability
to corporations, which he describes as constructive corporate fault.97
This standard requires proof of two things: “(1) an illegal corporate
act; and (2) a concurrent corporate criminal state of mind.”98 To
determine whether the act is attributable to the corporate entity,
“[a]n objective test determines whether given the size, complexity,
formality, functionality, decision making process, and structure of the
corporate organization, the agents’ acts are fairly said to be the
actions of the corporation.”99 Once it is determined that the acts may
be attributed to the entity, the next question is what particular state of
mind such a corporation would have.100 To determine whether a
corporation possessed the appropriate level of mens rea to meet that
element of the particular offense, we would ask “whether the average
corporation of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure, given
the circumstances presented, would have the required state of
mind.”101 As Diamantis points out, however, this test nonetheless
94. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991).
95. See id. at 1101, 1138.
96. Diamantis, supra note 74, at 2072–73. But see Robert E. Wagner, Criminal
Corporate Character, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2013) (arguing that evidence concerning
the character of a corporation should be admissible in criminal settings to prove that the
corporation acted in conformity with its alleged character).
97. See generally Laufer, supra note 12 (proposing a new standard for corporate
culpability).
98. Laufer & Strudler, supra note 81, at 1308.
99. Id. at 1309.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1310.
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presupposes some prior understanding of what mental state an
“average corporation” would have in a particular set of
circumstances, thereby immediately reconstituting the problem of
determining what constitutes corporate mens rea.102
Fact-Finder Inferences. Diamantis proposes that, in lieu of
seeking theories of corporate mens rea, we allow fact finders to apply
the same inferential processes for determining intent that they would
use for natural persons.103 He notes that juries already discern
individual human intent by drawing inferences from actions and
circumstances in the absence of a clear view into the defendant’s
brain.104 Pointing to cognitive science literature that shows humans
assign blame to groups in the same way that they assign blame to
individuals,105 he suggests that juries be allowed to “determine which
narrative [of corporate intent] they find most plausible.”106
This idea, while appealingly simple to implement, runs afoul of
the rule of law. While jurors infer individual intent from actions, they
necessarily do so by comparing the case to what they already know
about how individual intent works, based upon being individuals with
the capacity to form intent. Juries are frequently told, for example, to
rely on their “common sense” and “intuition” to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses.107 The law’s reliance on this particular
function of juries has already been heavily criticized. Specifically,
research suggests that jurors assimilate the evidence they hear along
with their own past experiences into a coherent narrative, which acts
as a sort of cognitive filter and affects their evaluation of individual
pieces of evidence.108 Thus, we already have reason to believe that, as
Diamantis says, jurors certainly can and do use narrative to assign
blame to individuals. But we also know that, due to the potentially
102. Diamantis, supra note 74, at 2074.
103. Id. at 2053, 2076–77.
104. Id. at 2076–77.
105. Id. at 2077–80.
106. Id. at 2082.
107. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845–46 (1973) (explaining that the
jury could use its common sense and experience to find that the defendant knew he had
possession of stolen property).
108. See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE
JURY 22–23 (1983); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY DECISION MAKING 192, 192–
203 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 560–61 (2004). It is this
phenomenon that has, for example, been used to explain evidence suggesting that jury
race affects trial outcomes due to jurors’ sympathy for victims of the same race. See Nancy
J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 78 (1993).
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subjective quality of these narratives, this may not always result in
like cases being treated alike, which is an important feature of the
rule of law.109 Even assuming this effect is unavoidable in a world of
human fact finders—and even assuming, as has been argued, that
scholars overstate the extent to which this phenomenon results in
irrational jury decisions110—it seems unwise to actively rely on it and
even amplify it. At least when jurors incorporate their own subjective
narratives into their inferences about intent, they are comparing the
facts of the case to something about which they have actual
experience: what it means, as an individual, to intend something. If we
ask them to perform the blaming function without any instruction
about what the essence of corporate intent is, we are throwing the
entire process of corporate criminal adjudication into an open-ended
fog of subjectivity. There is no avoiding the need for a workable
theory of entity liability.
D. The Interaction of Respondeat Superior and the Federal Criminal
Code
The problem raised by critics, that respondeat superior results in
excessive corporate criminal liability for blameless entities for the acts
of rogue employees, is amplified in the federal context. To
understand this problem, take as an example a pair of hypothetical
prosecutions under § 331 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Section 331 prohibits, among other things, “causing” the
“adulteration or misbranding of any . . . drug . . . in interstate
commerce” or “causing” the “introduction or delivery for
introduction into interstate commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is
adulterated or misbranded.”111 Any person who takes or causes any of
the actions proscribed in § 331 is guilty of a misdemeanor;112 if he or
she had “the intent to defraud or mislead,” or was previously
convicted under § 331, then he or she is guilty of a felony.113
In the first example, we have Happy Drugs, a chain of
compounding pharmacies that does business across most of the
109. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 38, at 237 (1971).
110. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 407, 409 (2013) (criticizing the “myth” that juries ignore evidentiary instructions
and arguing that “evidentiary instructions probably do work, but imperfectly, and better
under some conditions than others”).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)–(b) (2012).
112. See id. § 333(a)(1); see also Yi-Chen Su, The Extent of Harm to the Victim as an
Alternative Aggravating Factor for the Conviction of Felony Fraud in the Context of FoodSafety Violations, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 658, 659 (2016).
113. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2012); see also Su, supra note 112, at 659.
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American East Coast and Midwest. The company has a strict training
program for its employees, including education about the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, and the many other complex FDA rules governing
its business. Every three months, each facility is subject to regular
inspections, as well as periodic random inspections. The company also
conducts a yearly audit. John Doe, the manager of the Madison,
Wisconsin, facility has fallen on hard times due to his daughter’s
unexpected health issues and decides to make a little side cash by
selling the active ingredient of one of Happy’s opioid painkillers on
the street. Happy Drugs detects the problem in about a month upon
random testing of a sample of product as part of their regular
inspection. Doe is apprehended and charged with a variety of
trafficking offenses. But, due to the fact that his theft of the
ingredient caused underdosed medication to be sold on the street,
Happy Drugs is also successfully prosecuted for a felony. Doe
intentionally introduced adulterated medication into interstate
commerce and, because the sales of the watered-down drug
benefitted the corporation, his crime can be imputed to the wholly
nonnegligent corporation.
In the second example, we have the same basic players, with the
exception that John Doe is distracted by his daughter’s health
problems and does not notice when one of his employees made a
mathematical error on the compounding specs for a new drug, which
results in half doses of opioid being bottled and consequently
mislabeled as full doses, which Happy Drugs immediately detects. In
that case, due to the lack of mens rea element for a misdemeanor
conviction under § 331, John Doe is arrested and criminally convicted,
without the opportunity to make a defense of nonnegligence.
Furthermore, Happy Drugs can be criminally convicted as well,
despite being nonnegligent vis-à-vis their employee’s unintentional
conduct.
The first example showed the potential harshness of holding
generally well-behaved, faultless corporations responsible for the
criminal acts of individual employees. The second showed that the
relationship between true fault and criminal liability is even more
attenuated when courts impute even inadvertent employee actions to
nonnegligent corporate employers for the purposes of imposing
criminal liability.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE
The critique of criminal respondeat superior summarized thus far
focuses primarily on the extent to which it is overly punitive.114 The
exception is the concern raised by critics who fear that evidentiary
barriers and the complexities of corporate operations may sometimes
result in corporate crimes going unpunished entirely where a criminal
employee cannot be identified.115 Part II identifies another way in
which respondeat superior systematically undercriminalizes corporate
employers, precisely when the worst sorts of crimes have occurred.
A. The Requirement that the Crime Benefit the Employer
One of the few limiting principles of respondeat superior is that a
corporation may only be bound by the acts of its employees when the
employee has acted, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.116 This
is a separate question from the related requirement that the employee
have acted within the scope of his or her employment.117 As
mentioned earlier, under traditional principles of agency in tort law,
the question of whether an employee acted within the scope of his
employment for the purposes of holding his employer liable for civil
fraud is informed by the intent to benefit the employer.118 Under
criminal law, however, they remain distinct elements.

114. See supra Section I.B.1.
115. See supra Section I.B.2.
116. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70,
at 502 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the rule applies when a “servant’s conduct . . . is
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master”); see, e.g., United States v.
Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that a corporate employer can be held liable
for an employee’s actions if “the agent is ‘performing acts of the kind which he is
authorized to perform,’ and those acts are ‘motivated—at least in part—by an intent to
benefit the corporation’” (quoting United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241–42 (1st Cir.
1982))); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998) (“A corporation is
criminally responsible for the ‘acts of its officers, agents, and employees committed within
the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the corporation.’” (quoting United
States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 n.7 (8th Cir. 1983))).
117. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126–27 (1958)
(holding that a partnership can be liable for acts committed knowingly by employees in
the scope of their employment).
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(“When [a transactional activity] is misused, for example to perpetrate a fraud for the
employee’s sole benefit, the employer’s responsibility is often determined by whether the
party injured reasonably believed the employee’s activity to be authorized.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“An act of a servant
is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part
of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed.”).
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Indeed, in New York Central the Supreme Court highlighted the
relevance of benefit to the employer as a particular justification for
importing respondeat superior from tort law into criminal law in the
first place. Discussing the findings of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which formed the basis for the Elkins Act, the Court
stated:
It is a part of the public history of the times that statutes against
rebates could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals
only were subject to punishment for violation of the law, when
the giving of rebates or concessions enured to the benefit of the
corporations of which the individuals were but the
instruments.119
The Court’s interest here, as elsewhere in the opinion, is pragmatic:
the regulation of interstate commerce would be impossible without
the power to reach the benefitted corporations through the conduct
of their employees.120 Employees are “instruments” when they act to
the advantage of their employers. To be held criminally liable under
respondeat superior, it is not necessary that the corporation received
a benefit in fact from its employee’s actions so long as the employee
intended to bestow it.121 On the flip side, as an evidentiary matter,
courts allow the inference that an employee intended to benefit the
corporation wherever his misconduct did indeed have that effect.122
That said, when an employee commits a crime that is contrary to
the interests of the corporation and from which the corporation
derives no benefit, the corporation is not subject to criminal

119. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
120. See supra text accompanying note 119.
121. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“[W]hether the agent’s actions ultimately redounded to the benefit of the corporation is
less significant than whether the agent acted with the intent to benefit the corporation.”);
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[A] corporation may not be
held strictly accountable for acts that could not benefit the stockholders, such as acts of
corporate officers that are performed in exchange for bribes paid to the officers
personally.”); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128–29 (5th Cir.
1962) (“[An employee’s] act is no less the principal’s if from such intended conduct either
no benefit accrues, a benefit is undiscernible, or, for that matter, the result turns out to be
adverse.”).
122. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that an employee’s actual defrauding of his corporation nonetheless met
the element of benefitting the corporation because his actions “promised some benefit” to
the corporation); Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 407 (finding the element satisfied
because the employee’s efforts at personal advancement also “depended on [the
corporation’s] well-being”); Michael Nagelberg et al., Corporate Criminal Liability, 54
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2017).
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liability.123 In Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States,124 the Fifth
Circuit overturned the convictions of the defendant oil corporations
whose employees engaged in a scheme involving the moving and
reassigning of oil to other wells in violation of the Connally Hot Oil
Act.125 The court found that the government had not proven intent to
benefit the corporation, observing that while “[w]ithout Pasotex and
its pipeline transportation, and without Standard’s purchase of such
‘hot’ or non-existent oil, Thompson could not succeed,” nonetheless
the employees “were doing their usual tasks in handling run tickets
not to advance or further the interest of Pasotex” but “to further the
criminal enterprise of which they were an indispensable part.”126
In United States v. Ridglea State Bank,127 two banks had been
charged with violating the False Claims Amendments Act after the
federal government reimbursed the banks for losses on loans a single
employee had fraudulently approved.128 In holding the banks not
liable because the employee did not intend to benefit them, the court
stated that the employee “must have known that the loans he
approved would be defaulted, so that the banks would not make any
money on interest on the loans.”129 Indeed, the employee’s “approval
of fraudulent applications for FHA-insured loans endangered the
bank’s ability to continue to handle FHA business and jeopardized
the reputation of the banks and their financial integrity.”130 The
employee’s actual purpose “was to line his own pockets . . . and to get
money to make payments on loans previously approved by him on the
basis of fraudulent applications, so that these earlier wrongdoings
would remain concealed.”131
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government’s reliance
on civil case law establishing that an employer is generally “held
liable for the fraudulent misrepresentations of his agent, even though
the agent acted without any intent to benefit his employer, so long as
the third person reasonably believed that the agent was acting within
the scope of his employment.”132 The court distinguished traditional
123. Nagelberg et al., supra note 122, at 1080–81.
124. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
125. Id. at 122–24, 131.
126. Id. at 129.
127. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966), superseded by statute, False Claims Amendments Act
of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, § 2(b), 100 Stat. 3153.
128. See id. at 496–97.
129. Id. at 498.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 499.
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compensatory civil actions from the False Claims Amendments Act
context, with its potential for forfeitures and double damages in
excess of actual loss rendering it punitive in purpose.133 In so doing,
the court reaffirmed the fact that, in a criminal case, the scope-ofemployment requirement and benefit to employer requirement are
distinct.134
The requirement that agents intend to provide a benefit to the
corporation is meant to “insulate the corporation from criminal
liability for actions of its agents which be inimical to the interests of
the corporation or which may have been undertaken solely to
advance the interests of that agent or of a party other than the
corporation.”135 Standard Oil remains the rule by which courts decline
to hold corporations criminally liable where the employee acted
entirely in his or her own interest.136 Furthermore, while “a
corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to
express instructions and policies, . . . the existence of such instructions
and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee
in fact acted to benefit the corporation.”137
Recently, however, the Fifth Circuit—again leading the way in
developing this doctrine—added a new wrinkle. In United States ex
rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,138 a qui tam suit initiated by
private parties under the Anti-Kickback Act, the government alleged
the defendant defense contractor was vicariously liable for its
employees’ acceptance of kickbacks in exchange for favorable

133. See id. at 499–500.
134. See id. at 498–99.
135. United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985)
(first citing Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); and
then citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 33 (1972)).
136. See Michael E. Tigar, It Does the Crime but Not the Time: Corporate Criminal
Liability in Federal Law, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 211, 228 (1990) (describing Standard Oil as
the “leading case” for the defense of no intent to benefit the corporation); see also United
States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1978) (“However, since the Chemical
employees involved here had been bribed to wash the currency without reporting the
transactions as required by the Bank Secrecy Act, the bank could well have argued that it
was not liable for their violations of the Act since the employees had acted in their own
and not the bank’s interests.” (first citing United States v. Ridglea, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1966); and then citing Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1962))); First Fed. Sav. Bank of Hegewisch v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 774, 792 (2002)
(citing Standard Oil and later cases to hold that a corporation could not be held liable
when an employee admitted to “embezzlement, misappropriat[ing] funds through
unauthorized loans, and extortion,” because these crimes did not “benefit[] [the
corporation] in any way”).
137. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013).
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treatment on subcontracts.139 Relying on Ridglea and the fact that the
Anti-Kickback Act (like the False Claims Amendments Act) allowed
recovery in excess of loss and was thus quasi-criminal, the district
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the government had “not sufficiently alleged that [Kellogg Brown &
Root] employees were acting for the corporation’s benefit.”140 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding no evidence of congressional intent to
vary from the civil law standard and that actual compensation to the
government for kickback-related losses might require penalties in
excess of the value of the kickback itself.141
Because Kellogg Brown did not, technically, involve criminal
liability, it did nothing to change the rule that an employee’s crime be
intended to benefit his employer in order for the employer to be held
criminally liable. In demonstrating the blurry conceptual line between
the scope-of-employment requirement and the intent-to-benefit
requirement, however, it does underscore how precarious the
doctrine is. Complex federal statutory regimes create what amounts
to quasi-punitive liability, and courts now appear to treat some, but
not all of them, like civil actions for the purposes of excusing the
government from proving the intent to benefit. Given that fact, and
given how few cases seem to turn on the intent-to-benefit
requirement in the first place, it may seem that this doctrine excludes
very few corporations from potential prosecution. That, however, is
far from true.
It is now a basic feature of our criminal justice system that the
majority of prosecutions are resolved by plea bargain rather than
trial.142 Thus, the outcome of any given case turns heavily on the
prosecutor’s initial charging decision. These decisions turn at least in
part on whether the government could win a case if it were to go to
trial. While states have different rules governing a prosecutor’s use of
discretion, they are all bound by the requirement that charging

139. Id. at 344–45.
140. Id. at 350–52.
141. See id. at 344, 352.
142. See Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea
Bargaining, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/
05/plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/ [https://perma.cc/BT5T-MAWU] (stating
that approximately ninety-seven percent of federal cases are settled by plea bargaining);
Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justiceis-served-behind-closed-doors.html [https://perma.cc/6T69-CKGF (dark archive)].
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decisions be limited by probable cause.143 Indeed, some states
evaluate charging decisions based on objective, rather than subjective,
standards, asking not whether a particular prosecutor believed she
had probable cause to bring charges but whether a reasonable
prosecutor would have so believed.144 Thus, a prosecutor should not—
and generally will not—bring charges if a particular element of an
offense cannot be met.
Federal prosecutors have specific guidance about how and when
to charge corporations with misconduct, using the elements of
criminal respondeat superior as a starting point. The Justice Manual
states that “[a]gents may act for mixed reasons—both for selfaggrandizement (direct and indirect) and for the benefit of the
corporation, and a corporation may be held liable as long as one
motivation of its agent is to benefit the corporation.”145 This suggests
that federal prosecutors should not pursue corporate liability in cases
where the agent’s sole motivation was self-aggrandizement. Against
this backdrop, the requirement of intent to benefit the corporation
necessarily screens out many claims against organizations where such
intent to benefit cannot be shown. While state prosecutors generally
lack such formalized guidance about corporate crime in their policy
documents, they are, of course, subject to the same substantive law on
the question of respondeat superior.
This part reviews certain scenarios where, likely as a result of the
intent-to-benefit requirement, prosecutors cannot and do not address
corporate complicity in the very worst sorts of offenses, which I will
call acts of “corporate violence.” I have argued elsewhere that when a
corporation commits a crime, it imposes additional harms on its
victims distinct from that which can be attributed to the individual
employees who were its agents.146 These harms boil down to the oftdocumented sense of helplessness a victim feels when faced with a
perpetrator that is temporally enduring, powerful, and
143. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 42.4 (3d ed. 2009) (listing the probability of conviction as one of the factors appropriate for
prosecutors to consider in making their charging decisions and noting that “commencing a
prosecution is permitted by most ethical standards upon a determination that probable
cause exists” but that “the charging standard should be the prosecutor’s reasonable belief
that the charges can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial”).
144. See Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging
Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2199 (2010). These
states include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, and New York. Id.
145. Justice Manual § 9-28.210(B), DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.210 [https://perma.cc/MCR9YAPB].
146. See Sheley, supra note 59, at 259–63.
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organizationally complex.147 The shattering of a victim’s “belief in a
just world”—a core psychological heuristic, central to wellbeing—that
occurs when a corporate offender goes unpunished becomes a unique
sort of harm flowing from the corporate structure itself.148 My original
argument was directed toward conduct that easily meets the current
standard for criminal respondeat superior—the long-term
psychological harms suffered by the victims of corporate
environmental offenses, for example.149 That argument was
speculative in some respects because of the need for more
psychological research on the victims of corporate crime. But there
are a wealth of recent examples of how this harm arises most
dramatically and most discernably in cases of corporate violence,
where prosecution is not generally an option due to the intent-tobenefit requirement.
B.

Corporate Sex Crimes

In 1996, Dr. Larry Nassar was named national medical
coordinator for the USA gymnastics team (“USA Gymnastics”).150
The next year he also became team physician for the Michigan State
University (“MSU”) gymnastics team and assistant professor at the
university.151 Throughout the 90’s and early aughts, multiple parents
and athletes reported to USA Gymnastics coaches, MSU coaches,
MSU athletic staff, and, on one occasion, the Meridian Township
Police Department, that Nassar performed irregular “treatments”
that they perceived as sexual molestation.152 For almost twenty years,
both MSU and USA Gymnastics failed to investigate the complaints,
accepted Nassar’s assertions that his conduct constituted valid
medical treatment, and continued to refer their athletes to him.153 In
2014, MSU graduate Amanda Thomashow reported to a doctor at the
MSU Sports Medicine Clinic that she had been sexually assaulted
during an examination.154 At this time, University President Lou
Anna K. Simon learned that a police report had been filed, but
Nassar was allowed to continue seeing patients during the sixteen
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 261–63.
150. James Dator, A Comprehensive Timeline of the Larry Nassar Case, SBNATION,
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/1/19/16900674/larry-nassar-abuse-timeline-usa-gymnasticsmichigan-state [https://perma.cc/RG5C-YZU8] (last updated Jan. 16, 2019).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
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months of the police investigation.155 In August 2016, the Indianapolis
Star published an investigation of sexual abuse of the USA
Gymnastics team, featuring the account of Rachael Denhollander,
Nassar’s first victim to go public with her story.156 In the end, Nassar
pled guilty to seven counts of first-degree criminal sexual misconduct
in Ingham County Circuit Court, three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct in Eaton County Circuit Court, and federal child
pornography charges.157
At Nassar’s state sentencing hearing, nearly 160 of the athletes
he had abused delivered victim-impact statements.158 As I have
argued elsewhere, close attention to the accounts of harm expressed
in victim-impact statements is important not only for victim
vindication and expression but also as a measure of the nature of the
public harm created by the crime.159 Because victims’ narratives
circulate through society outside the courtroom as well, the public
experiences that harm through the lens of the victim’s subjective
account.160 A survey of the Nassar victim-impact statements
demonstrates how clearly the harm suffered by Nassar’s victims was
magnified by the institutional roles of USA Gymnastics and MSU.
The most famous victim, Aly Raisman, was team captain of both the
2012 and 2016 gold-medal-winning USA Gymnastics teams and an
individual silver medalist in the all-around and floor competitions at
the 2016 games.161 Due to her high profile and eloquence, Raisman’s
victim-impact statement became one of the most widely reproduced.

155. Id.
156. Eric Levenson, How the Indy Star and Rachael Denhollander Took Down Larry
Nassar, CNN (Jan. 25, 2018, 5:27 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/us/larry-nassarindy-star/index.html [https://perma.cc/G5CK-E72Q]; see also Dator, supra note 150
(reporting that Denhollander also filed criminal charges that month).
157. Dator, supra note 150.
158. Anne E. Gowen, How the Judge in Larry Nassar’s Case Undermined Justice, TIME
(Jan. 26, 2018), http://time.com/5119433/larry-nassar-judge-rosemarie-aquilina-justice/
[http://perma.cc/XL3E-R8WV]. Allowing the 160 victim-impact statements has been
criticized for raising due process issues, given that Nassar only pled guilty to assaulting
seven victims. Marie Weidmayer, Michigan Law, Courts Clash on Definition of “Victim”,
ST. NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://statenews.com/article/2018/04/state-vs-courtvictim-meaning [https://perma.cc/B7E5-YCCR].
159. See Erin Sheley, Reverberations of the Victim’s ‘Voice’: Victim Impact Statements
and the Cultural Project of Punishment, 87 IND. L.J. 1247, 1248–49 (2012) (“[T]he
complexity of a victim narrative effectively conveys the social experience of harm, without
which the criminal justice system loses its legitimacy as a penal authority.”).
160. Id. at 1249–50.
161. Aly Raisman, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.biography.com/people/alyraisman-20900231 [https://perma.cc/SMA8-99TQ].
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Notably, her indictment of Nassar emphasized the particular
position of power he had been given by USA Gymnastics: “You were
the USA Gymnastics national team doctor, the Michigan State’s
Olympic team doctor. You were trusted by so many and took
advantage of countless athletes and their families.”162 Her
description of his abuse reveals how helpless she felt in a situation
that had been created and imposed by USA Gymnastics as a
condition of maintaining her career: “I don’t want you to be there,
but I don’t have a choice. Treatments with you were
mandatory.”163 And she notes how the organizations to which she
was beholden as an athlete elevated him to positions of
institutional importance: “You were decorated by USA
Gymnastics and the United States Olympic Committee, both of
which put you on advisory boards and committees to come up with
policies that would protect athletes from this kind of abuse.” 164
Most significantly, Raisman criticized USA Gymnastics’
failure to do anything when they had notice of a problem: “False
assurances from organizations are dangerous, especially when
people want so badly to believe them. They make it easier to
move away from the problem and enable bad things to continue to
happen.”165 In pointing out the timespan of the ongoing denials,
she suggested the enduring nature of USA Gymnastics as an
organization, one of the precise features of a corporate criminal I
have identified in my earlier work as contributing to a victim’s
sense of helplessness in the face of a power asymmetry. 166 She also
points out the facilitating role played by USA Gymnastics in
maintaining Nassar’s sexual power.
Rachael Denhollander echoed Raisman’s theme, describing how
organizational complicity by MSU and USA Gymnastics exacerbated
and extended her sexual violation. Referring to her first experience of
abuse, she said:
[T]hree things I was very sure of. First, it was clear to me this
was something Larry did regularly. Second, because this was
something Larry did regularly, it was impossible that at least
some women and girls had not described what was going on to
162. Mahita Gajanan, ‘It’s Your Turn to Listen to Me.’ Read Aly Raisman’s Testimony
at Larry Nassar’s Sentencing, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:52 PM), http://time.com/5110455/alyraisman-larry-nassar-testimony-trial/ [http://perma.cc/9PR8-3LWW].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Sheley, supra note 59, at 258–59.
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officials at MSU and [USA Gymnastics]. I was confident of this.
And third, I was confident that because people at MSU and
[USA Gymnastics] had to be aware of what Larry was doing
and had not stopped him, there could surely be no question
about the legitimacy of his treatment. This must be medical
treatment. The problem must be me.167
And, like Raisman, she conveyed how nonfeasance by the
organizations that employed Nassar constituted additional acts of
violence to the victims: “MSU, you need to realize that you are
greatly compounding the damage done to these abuse victims by the
way you are responding.”168
Similarly, victim Amanda Thomashow stated that MSU
exacerbated her sexual violation by normalizing it in the language of
medicine, to which she, presumably, had no claims of knowledge:
“Michigan State University, the school I loved and trusted, had the
audacity to tell me that I did not understand the difference between
sexual assault and a medical procedure.”169 In this account, Nassar
and MSU formed a kind of interconnected block of authority; as
Nassar wielded sexual control over her body, MSU claimed authority
over her mind by denying her even interpretive agency.
What these accounts all emphasize is the extent to which
Nassar’s victims experienced organizational complicity by USA
Gymnastics and MSU—through both their empowering Nassar and
rejecting his victims’ stories—as additional acts of bodily violence.
While these impact statements were intended to be directed to Nassar
himself, the victims appeared to find it almost impossible to navigate
their shared trauma from the sexual assault without addressing his
organizational employers directly. Nassar had power not due to any
intrinsic property but due to his identity as an agent of USA
Gymnastics and MSU—the organizations upon which these girls and
women perceived their athletic futures to rest.
Given the deep involvement of USA Gymnastics and MSU from
the perspective of the victims—so deep that these organizations
became the focus of victim-impact statements directed at Nassar—the
question arises as to whether the organizations themselves should be
167. Read Rachael Denhollander’s Full Victim Impact Statement About Larry Nassar,
CNN (Jan. 30, 2018, 7:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/rachael-denhollanderfull-statement/index.html [https://perma.cc/SD2G-KLUB].
168. Id.
169. Sonia Moghe & Lauren del Valle, Larry Nassar’s Victims, in Their Own Words,
CNN (Jan. 17, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/16/us/nassar-victim-impactstatements/index.html [http://perma.cc/RB78-N3A5].
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criminally accountable. Surely the harm perpetrated under their
auspices and with their authority for over two decades is worse than
many of the federal regulatory offenses for which prosecutors
routinely charge corporations. Unfortunately, however, even setting
aside the unique sovereign immunity issues presented by MSU, a
state organization, the respondeat superior standard most likely
precludes criminal action based on Nassar’s agency.170
Despite the seeming breadth of criminal respondeat superior,
courts have routinely held that corporations cannot be liable for
rape.171 Yet, as V.S. Khanna notes, the argument that corporations
cannot commit these acts is weak because “[o]nce society is willing to
accept vicarious liability and to impute agents’ acts to the corporation,
the corporation should in theory be capable of ‘committing’ rape or
murder.”172 Khanna suggests that the more powerful conceptual
roadblock to corporate liability under these circumstances is the fact
that most crimes of violence and sexual violence do not fall within the
scope of the perpetrator’s employment.173 If anything, traumatizing
their athletes is inimical to the goals of the organizations.
It would seem prosecutors could try to reach beyond Nassar
himself to prosecute individual officers and employees of USA
Gymnastics and MSU for negligent oversight of their physician,
particularly in light of the complaints they received.174 After Penn
State Assistant Football Coach Jerry Sandusky was convicted for
numerous counts of child sexual abuse in connection with the
nonprofit organization for youth he ran under university auspices,
several Penn State administrators were convicted of child
endangerment.175 The various officials who ignored the reports on

170. As a private 501(c)(3) entity, USA Gymnastics poses no such sovereign immunity
concerns. See About USA Gymnastics, USA GYMNASTICS, https://usagym.org/pages/
aboutus/pages/about_usag.html [https://perma.cc/HYD4-FUWW]; see also Jack’s Canoes
& Kayaks, LLC v. Nat’l Park Serv., 937 F. Supp. 2d 18, 40 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that “a
501(c)(3) non-governmental organization [was] not entitled to sovereign immunity”).
171. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 3.2.3(d), at
177–78 (1994).
172. Khanna, supra note 54, at 1484 n.37; see also GRUNER, supra note 171, § 3.2.3(b),
at 175–76.
173. Khanna, supra note 54, at 1484 n.37.
174. See Michael McCann, Four Key Sports Law Implications of the Larry Nassar
Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.si.com/olympics/2018/01/
19/larry-nassar-scandal-sports-law-implications [https://perma.cc/3ADE-DSV7].
175. Camila Domonoske, 3 Ex-Penn State Officials Get Jail Time for Failure to Report
Sandusky Abuse, NPR (June 2, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/06/02/531243225/3-penn-state-officials-sentenced-to-jail-time-for-failure-to-report-sandusky
[https://perma.cc/GJX4-G29Y].
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Nassar are potentially similarly guilty; language of the Michigan child
abuse laws, however, seems to preclude this.
The Michigan child abuse statute includes in its definition of
applicable parties “any . . . person who cares for, has custody of, or
has authority over a child regardless of the length of time that a child
is cared for, in the custody of, or subject to the authority of that
person,” which would seem broad enough to include USA
Gymnastics staff.176 Yet the requisite mens rea stipulated is either
knowing or intentional harm to the child,177 something that could be
very hard to prove on the facts. Those accused could also be liable for
an omission that results in harm to a child, but the statute defines
“omission” somewhat narrowly as “a willful failure to provide food,
clothing, or shelter necessary for a child’s welfare or willful
abandonment of a child.”178 Thus, the specific omissions of USA
Gymnastics and MSU employees do not seem to fall into this
prohibition. In short, while cases like Sandusky’s demonstrate how
prosecutors of sexual assault in the course of employment might be
able to address institutional misconduct by targeting employees
beyond the assailant himself, not all state criminal codes make that
possible. Even where prosecutors are able to make charges stick to
other employees (which they should do in these cases where possible,
and may yet find a way to do in the case of USA Gymnastics/MSU),179
failure to impose criminal liability on the organizations themselves
will leave unredressed the institutional harm articulated by Nassar’s
victims.
If respondeat superior precludes vicarious criminal liability due
to Nassar’s lack of intent to benefit the organization, another
possibility could be direct liability for the organizations for aiding and
abetting his conduct. Michigan has abolished the distinction between
the principal and accessories to an offense, such that “[e]very person
concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly

176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b(1)(d) (Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 2 of
2019 Reg. Sess.).
177. See id. § 750.136b(2)–(7).
178. Id. § 750.136b(1)(c).
179. Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette has said that “[i]t is abundantly clear
that a full and complete investigation of what happened at Michigan State University from
the president’s office down, is required” and that the investigation will seek to determine
“who knew what and when, who took action, who failed to take action.” Amy Held, State
AG: Michigan State University Under Investigation in Ongoing Nassar Fallout, NPR (Jan.
27, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/27/581324655/state-agmichigan-state-university-under-investigation-in-ongoing-nassar-fallout [https://perma.cc/
C4XS-XHH6].
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commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or
abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried
and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed
such offense.”180 However, Michigan, like most jurisdictions, requires
as an element of aiding and abetting that “the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal
intended its commission at the time [the defendant] gave aid and
encouragement.”181
Under this rule, coupled with respondeat superior, USA
Gymnastics or MSU (were it not for sovereign immunity issues) could
therefore be criminally liable if prosecutors could find an employee
who intended or knew that Nassar intended to commit sexual assault.
Institutional prosecution for aiding and abetting, then, faces the same
problems as an effort to go after other individuals for child abuse: it
may be very difficult to show actual knowledge of his misconduct by
any particular person. These organizations can simply argue that their
employees had the honest but mistaken (even if unreasonable) belief
that Nassar’s methods were legitimately medical.182 Indeed, MSU
already seems to be organizing that defense; its Board of Trustees
released a letter reiterating the belief held by former U.S. Attorney
Patrick Fitzgerald, MSU’s outside counsel, that “the evidence will
show that no MSU official believed that Nassar committed sexual
abuse prior to newspaper reports in the summer of 2016.”183 It is clear
that the intent-to-benefit requirement of respondeat superior
dramatically limits opportunities to hold at least USA Gymnastics
criminally liable for the collective gross negligence that allowed so
many young girls and women to be institutionally sexually assaulted.

180. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.39 (Westlaw through P.A. 2019, No. 2 of 2019
Reg. Sess.).
181. People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Mich. 2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting People v. Moore, 679 N.W.2d 41, 49 (Mich. 2004)).
182. The most promising possibility for prosecutors aiming for either individual
employees or the organizations is a theory of willful blindness. In cases where the
defendant has intentionally kept himself unaware of facts that, had he known them, would
have made him criminally liable, evidence of this fact can substitute for proof of actual
knowledge. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700–04 (9th Cir. 1976). While a
showing of consciously intentional ignorance may also prove challenging, there is some
evidence that federal courts, at least, have allowed the application of willful ignorance
under circumstances better described as merely “reckless ignorance.” See Alexander F.
Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 158–67 (2017).
183. Letter from the Bd. of Trs. for Mich. State Univ. to Bill Schuette, Attorney Gen.
of Mich. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://msu.edu/ourcommitment/news/BOT%20Letter%20to%
20AG%20011918.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2Y7-D68X].
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The Nassar and Sandusky cases are hardly the only examples of
what could properly be termed corporate sexual violence. The
increasingly high profile of the #MeToo movement provides many
others, but perhaps none so clear cut as the allegations against
Miramax cofounder Harvey Weinstein and the institutional
wrongdoing of his production companies.184 Sixteen former and
current executives and assistants at Weinstein’s companies told The
New Yorker that they were fully aware of the unwanted sexual
contact Weinstein routinely imposed on women in professional
settings.185 Employees identified “a culture of complicity at
Weinstein’s places of business, with numerous people throughout his
companies fully aware of his behavior but either abetting it or looking
the other way.”186 Perhaps most disturbingly, some employees
admitted to actively engaging in subterfuge to facilitate Weinstein’s
assaults.187 While Weinstein himself is now being prosecuted, no
charges have been filed as of yet against his companies.
C.

Corporate Homicide

Sexual assault cases are unique insofar as it is difficult (though
not impossible) to conceive of a set of circumstances where an
employee’s abuse of his professional position for sexual gratification
was intended to benefit his employer. A more common example of
corporate violence that better fits the current criminal respondeat
superior framework is homicide. Obviously, corporations and their
employees that are engaged in dangerous work may commit homicide
through reckless or unlawful behavior that was intended to benefit
the corporation. Every mining disaster or oil spill that claims lives due
to reckless or criminally negligent behavior falls into this category.
During the 1980s, state legislatures began to amend their
criminal codes to include corporations and organizations within the
definition of “person” for the purpose of opening corporations up to
criminal punishment for crimes of homicide.188 For example, Indiana
184. See generally Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey
Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harveyweinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://perma.cc/5PN9-8VYY] (describing Weinstein’s
behaviors as an “open secret to many in Hollywood and beyond”).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal
Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 753, 758 (1987); James W. Harlow,
Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: A Statutory Framework, 61 DUKE L.J.
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prosecuted Ford Motor Company (albeit unsuccessfully) for reckless
homicide after three women died when their Ford Pinto exploded
after being rear ended.189 Illinois prosecuted Film Recovery Systems,
Inc. for involuntary manslaughter after a worker died from acute
cyanide toxicity due to working in an unventilated plant full of open
vats of sodium cyanide.190 Yet, after this apparent uptick in
prosecutorial activity, the drive to criminally prosecute corporations
for homicide appears to have lost momentum.191
There have been some difficulties in judicial construction of the
offense. For example, while corporate homicide has been recognized
by New York courts,192 it has been limited to cases where the cause of
death was foreseeable.193 In People v. Warner-Lambert,194 six of the
defendant-gum-manufacturer’s employees were killed when
magnesium stearate residue accumulated on the plant’s machines and
in the air, causing an explosion.195 The court held that
[a]lthough [the defendants] were aware that there was a broad,
undifferentiated risk of an explosion in consequence of ambient
magnesium stearate dust arising from the procedures employed
in [Warner-Lambert’s] manufacturing operations, the corporate
and individual defendants may nonetheless not be criminally
liable, on the theory of either reckless or negligent conduct, for
the deaths of employees occasioned when such an explosion
123, 131–32 (2011). But see State v. Pac. Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530, 532 (Or. 1961) (en
banc) (holding that the Oregon homicide statute does not allow corporations to be
prosecuted).
189. See Fatal Ford Pinto Crash in Indiana, HISTORY (Nov. 13, 2009),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fatal-ford-pinto-crash-in-indiana [https://perma.cc/
H2LL-MKLS]; Larry Kramer, Jury Indicts Ford in Ind. Pinto Crash, WASH. POST (Sept.
14, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1978/09/14/jury-indictsford-in-ind-pinto-crash/39d186d8-b83a-44fd-88cf-d0e94f931045/?utm_term=.4e93f9484d83
[https://perma.cc/HYF2-G33X (dark archive)].
190. See People v. O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Barry Siegel,
Officers Convicted: Murder Case a Corporate Landmark, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1985),
http://articles.latimes.com/1985-09-15/news/mn-23348_1_corporate-officers [https://perma.cc/
Y43C-G6TQ]. The convictions of Film Recovery and its individual employees were
eventually reversed on the basis that “the same conduct [was] used to support offenses
[that had] mutually exclusive mental states.” O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1092, 1101.
191. Harlow, supra note 188, at 134. For a detailed history of corporate homicide
prosecutions, see id. at 128–34, 144–49.
192. See Peter T. Edelman, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The
Need to Punish Both the Corporate Entity and Its Officers, 92 DICK. L. REV. 193, 206–07
(1987).
193. See, e.g., People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 661, 666 (N.Y. 1980).
194. 414 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1980).
195. See id. at 661–62. The compound is generally inert but can be combustible when
airborne. Id. at 662.
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occurred where the triggering cause thereof was neither
foreseen nor foreseeable.196
While the foreseeability requirement is arguably no different
from the ordinary showing of objective fault necessary to prove an
individual guilty of negligent homicide,197 some have argued that it
raises unique causation dilemmas in the context of entity liability.198
Specifically in cases where death was likely due to a corporation’s
generalized negligence in the form of “latent failures,” under the rule
in Warner-Lambert a corporation might nonetheless escape liability if
the highly specific causal pathway to the actual death is not
foreseeable.199
Even in states without such precedent, however, critics say that
prosecutors undercharge corporate offenders for homicide relative to
the harm that they cause.200 Older data suggests that prosecutors seem
likely to let large corporations off the hook to focus on smaller,
privately held businesses.201 At the federal level, for example, in the
forty years since Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and
Health Act up until 2012, there were more than 400,000 workplace
fatalities, yet fewer than eighty cases were criminally prosecuted.202 Of
these, only approximately a dozen resulted in convictions.203 At least
fifteen states, in addition to the federal government, have cases on
record reflecting a corporation being prosecuted for manslaughter or
negligent homicide.204
196. Id. at 661.
197. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“Criminal
homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.”), with id.
§ 2.02(2)(d) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct.”).
198. See Harlow, supra note 188, at 146–49.
199. See id. at 147–49.
200. Id. at 134; see also The Case for a Corporate Homicide Law, CORP. CRIME REP.
(July 16, 2013, 6:55 AM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/
corporatehomicide07152013/ [https://perma.cc/KC4A-AYC9] (stating that only “rarely [do
you] see a prosecutor bring criminal charges against a corporation for the death of a
worker”).
201. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 n.1 (1999) (“On average, small privately held
businesses account for more than 95% of all corporate convictions each year.”).
202. Jordan B. Schwartz & Eric J. Conn, OSHA Criminal Referrals on the Rise,
EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.oshalawupdate.com/2012/
12/18/osha-criminal-referrals-on-the-rise/ [https://perma.cc/LJF7-NPWE].
203. Id.
204. See Harlow, supra note 188, at 133 & n.65 (noting that fifteen states and the
federal government have prosecuted corporations for manslaughter or criminally
negligent homicide).
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In short, corporate criminal liability appears underinclusive when
it comes to the sorts of conduct most clearly at the heart of criminal
law: grossly negligent and even intentional acts of violence against
victims. In cases of sexual assault, it is clear that the intent to benefit
element of criminal respondeat superior blocks corporate liability as a
matter of law. In cases of manslaughter and negligent homicide, the
causes of underinclusivity appear to be confusing state statutes and
potentially prosecutorial reluctance to pursue criminal charges on the
basis of an overbroad liability standard. To address the ways in which
corporate criminal liability is underinclusive, we may need a standard
that also addresses the ways in which it is overinclusive.
III. TORT ANSWERS
Unlike its newer criminal counterpart, the tort doctrine of
respondeat superior has had the advantage of common law
development across various jurisdictions over time. That tort law has
remained so largely a creature of the common law allows it to change
in accordance with social need while retaining internal coherence—
or, as Roscoe Pound optimistically put it, “in accordance with fixed
and definite rules in every way comparable to those which determine
the events of nature.”205 An attempt to create a more coherent
standard for attributing criminal liability through respondeat superior
should include a look at how courts have refined the doctrine in the
tort context.
A. The Purposes of Respondeat Superior in Tort and Criminal Law
Both criminal and tort law can be said to redress a form of
wrong.206 Both systems are also motivated by competing utilitarian
concerns such as deterrence.207 In criminal law, the conflict between
205. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 163 (Transaction Publishers
1999) (1963); see also O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Boston, Little, Brown,
and Co. 1881) (describing how the law adapts over time in response to new realities).
206. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“[Private wrongs] are an
infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered
as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: [public wrongs] are a
breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community,
considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and
misdemeanors.”); cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 220
(Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (arguing
that, while revenge vindicates a victim’s subjective interest in retribution, only a criminal
prosecution in a court vindicates the public’s universal moral interest).
207. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 101–10 (London,
Robert Heward 1830) (discussing the role of imprisonment); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39–45 (1968) (discussing the role of deterrence);
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justifications for punishment is quite familiar. The moral purposes of
criminal law, such as retribution and denunciation, tend to be the
flashpoints of public discourse.208 Yet policymakers and criminal
courts take utilitarian goals equally into account, and there is a deep
law-and-economics literature on the appropriate levels of punishment
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence.209 Certainly both sets of
goals, moral and utilitarian, are constitutionally acceptable purposes
of punishment, even though they are often famously at odds.210
Tort law is similarly fraught with tensions and outright conflicts
between moral and utilitarian justifications for liability.
Instrumentalists have been deeply influential in tort law, where
resource allocation,211 risk distribution,212 compensation,213 and
deterrence214 are frequently cited goals. Perhaps most famously,
Learned Hand’s formulation of negligence sets the level of care
required to avoid fault as that which will theoretically achieve optimal
deterrence of risk; a function of the burden of adequate precautions,
the probability of loss, and the resulting injury if that loss occurs.215 In
contrast to negligence, strict liability attaches regardless of how much

Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34 (1972)
(proposing a “hypothesis that liability for negligence is designed to bring about an efficient
level of accidents and safety”).
208. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime
and American Justice at the End of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507–11
(1997) (book review) (noting that “since the mid-seventies retribution has come back with
a vengeance, enjoying today a greater prominence in public discourse over crime and
punishment than at any other time in post-war America” (footnote omitted)).
209. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal
Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 175–76 (2005); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of
the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985).
210. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307–08 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
211. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–17 (1961).
212. Id. at 517–27.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(identifying “compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harms” as purposes of tort
liability); Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91
GEO. L.J. 585, 589–90 (2003).
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 6 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that negligence liability supplies an incentive to
deter unjust behavior); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1979) (identifying the deterrence of wrongful conduct as a purpose of tort liability).
215. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting forth
the Learned Hand formulation of negligence).
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care the defendant has taken, and its proponents typically cite the
instrumentalist goals of risk distribution and resource allocation.216
That said, rights-based tort theorists have made significant
headway, particularly in the development of fault doctrines.217 Similar
to moral-based retributivists in criminal law, rights-based theorists
define reasonable care under a negligence standard with reference to
moral or social norms, with the relevant question being what level of
concern individuals ought to be entitled to receive from others with
respect to their safety.218 Ernest Weinrib argues that negligence is the
appropriate standard for responsibility (as opposed to either extreme
of subjective fault or strict liability) because it balances two aspects of
the relationship of risk to human action: “the legitimacy of action”
and “the illegitimacy of indifference to the suffering that action can
cause.”219 By this standard, according to rights-based theorists, the
court can measure the entitlement of a particular plaintiff to
reparation from a particular defendant.220
Interestingly, despite the well-observed conflict between
negligence and strict liability as theories of tort responsibility—and,
indeed, the plurality of conflicting justifications for each of these
theories221—certain discrete doctrines have survived the test of time.
It has been suggested, in fact, that a tort doctrine can only endure in
the common law if it can be reconciled in some way with the concerns
of both instrumentalist and rights-based theories of tort.222 One such
durable doctrine is respondeat superior, and its development is thus
particularly salient to its counterpart in the similarly conflicted field
of criminal law.

216. See Calabresi, supra note 211, at 541; see also Joseph H. King, Jr., A GoalsOriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48
BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 349–58 (1996).
217. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271,
273 (2012) (arguing that “tort law doctrines may need to satisfy both instrumental and
rights-based concerns in order to be stable and persistent”); cf. GREGORY & KALVEN,
supra note 16, at 689 (claiming that “[t]he central policy issue in tort law is whether the
principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or on a wide distribution of
risk and loss”).
218. Abraham, supra note 217, at 274.
219. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 151 (1995).
220. Id. at 155; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 946 (2010) (“Tort law provides victims with an avenue of civil
recourse against those who have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them.”
(emphasis omitted)).
221. See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law
Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1309 (2001).
222. See Abraham, supra note 217, at 299–301.
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Vicarious liability has been called the “most ancient and
ubiquitous form of strict liability,”223 with respondeat superior—a
type of vicarious liability—holding “an employer . . . liable, despite
having no fault whatsoever, for the acts of its employees taken within
the scope of their employment.”224 As mentioned, strict liability arises
wherever a defendant may be held liable for a loss without any
showing of fault. It is liability imposed regardless of whether it would
have been cost effective under Learned Hand’s formula to take
precautions that would have eliminated the harm.225 Justifications for
strict liability as an alternative to negligence turn heavily on the
instrumentalist goal of risk distribution: a commercial injurer is in the
best position to insure against risk or otherwise broadly distribute the
costs of nonnegligently caused accidents among itself, its consumers,
and its other stakeholders.226 Furthermore, Guido Calabresi has
argued that strict liability will generally achieve better resource
allocation by causing the price of goods to reflect all of the costs of
their production, so demand can more accurately reflect how much of
something people truly want.227 Strict liability also serves other
instrumentalist goals, such as reducing the overall amount of a
dangerous activity engaged in (which negligence cannot generally
reach) and reducing the information and error costs accompanying a
jury’s factual determination of fault.228
There is also at least one moral, or rights-based, justification for
strict liability that seems particularly relevant to respondeat superior:
the idea that those who benefit from an activity should bear its
costs.229 Liability, according to this theory, arises not due to any
instrumental purpose but due to the relationship between the actor
who imposed the harm (its beneficiary) and its victim. As Kenneth
Abraham notes, however, this theory alone cannot explain a
manufacturer’s strict liability for harm to customers—arising, for
example, in products liability cases—because customers themselves

223. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1190, 1198 (1996).
224. Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001) (first citing Jones v.
Federated Fin. Reserve Corp., 144 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 1998); and then citing KEETON
ET AL., supra note 116, § 69, at 499–501).
225. Abraham, supra note 217, at 274–75.
226. See id. at 280.
227. Calabresi, supra note 211, at 505.
228. Abraham, supra note 217, at 276–80.
229. See Keating, supra note 221, at 1287; see also Abraham, supra note 217, at 281
(“The notion at the core of [the benefit] theory is that those who benefit from engaging in
an activity should rightly bear the costs associated with the activity.”).
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benefit from the manufacturer’s enterprise.230 He contends, therefore,
that some instrumental theory is necessary to fully justify strict
liability.231
Weinrib makes a somewhat different rights-based defense of
respondeat superior as a discrete doctrine. He argues that it is not
true strict liability at all based on the fact that, while “employers
cannot plead their own reasonable care in selecting or supervising the
employee, the employee’s exercise of reasonable care precludes
liability.”232 In other words, respondeat superior should not be seen as
a no-fault liability rule but as a means of channeling fault in cases
where a “faulty actor is sufficiently integrated into [an] enterprise”
and his “faulty act is sufficiently close to the assigned task” such that
they form an integrated legal persona.233 Once one accepts this
conceptual integration, one can then return to balancing the interests
of the employer-acting-through-the-employee and the injured party.
On the whole, however, respondeat superior has seen primarily
instrumentalist justifications in the modern era.234 Tort theorists have
advanced risk spreading as a primary justification for holding an
employer liable without fault for the torts of its employees.235 This
immediately poses a challenge for any application of respondeat
superior to the criminal context: most of the time, criminal law is not
about pure risk spreading, insofar as a criminal punishment does not
usually make a private victim whole, except on the occasions—still
inconsistently arising—in which a court imposes restitution as part of
a sentence.236 Furthermore, the distortive effects of the role of
prosecutorial discretion in our criminal system alter the allocation of
risk in ways that are difficult to predict.
It is, however, possible to think of risk spreading in terms of
nonmonetary currency. As Dan Kahan puts it, “[W]hen a corporation
is subjected to the stigmatizing effect of criminal conviction[,] what
the corporation loses is recovered, at least in part, by the public in the
230. Abraham, supra note 217, at 281.
231. Id. (“For answers to these questions, reference to incentive-based or insurancebased arguments is likely to be necessary.”).
232. WEINRIB, supra note 219, at 185.
233. Id. at 187.
234. See Rabin, supra note 223, at 1199.
235. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 22–28 (1967); 2 FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1365, 1368–71 (1956) (discussing
the historical origins of vicarious liability and arguing that one of the main justifications
for vicarious liability is accident prevention); cf. Calabresi, supra note 211, at 499–500
(discussing the “theoretical justifications” of “risk distribution”).
236. See Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 95–97
(2014).
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form of the satisfaction that citizens take in seeing the corporation’s
crime authoritatively repudiated.”237 In other words, the social
meaning of criminal punishment has a value which courts and
policymakers should factor into utilitarian cost-benefit analyses.
Perhaps, then, risk spreading can be a coherent benefit of criminal
punishment via respondeat superior if it can be argued that corporate
employers are better able to bear the risk of the stigma of conviction
than the general public is able to bear the expressive costs of failing to
see a corporation punished. The biggest challenge to this argument, of
course, is that the criminal punishment of a corporate employer, in
cases where it has no fault, may not carry much social meaning as
compared to prosecution of an individual employee who does have
the requisite mens rea. And while an employer may generally be
better positioned than an employee to compensate for financial
harms, this is not necessarily true or even coherent for expressive
harms. In other words, it is difficult to identify a purely expressive
value served by criminalizing a truly faultless entity. This fact suggests
that a negligence standard for corporate fault would—theoretically—
not only serve the instrumental goal of optimal deterrence but would
also better capture the denunciative benefits Kahan identifies as a
purpose of corporate punishment.
For the moment, it is sufficient to recognize that similar
categories of justification motivate both the criminal and tort systems
but that the expressive justification does more work in criminal law
than in tort and the risk distribution justification somewhat less. This
is, perhaps, a major reason why respondeat superior has proven so
unwieldy upon importation to the criminal arena. With that in mind,
we turn to how courts have dealt with the potential over- and
underinclusiveness of respondeat superior in tort cases.
B.

Common Law Refinements of Respondeat Superior

Earlier I reviewed the extensive critical literature on the
potential overinclusiveness of the respondeat superior standard in
criminal law. Particularly under the federal criminal code, with its
voluminous list of strict liability offenses, the standard can impute
criminal liability to faultless employers for the actions of employees
who were themselves acting without fault. At the other extreme end
of the spectrum, it can criminalize corporations for employees’
offenses, such as fraud and bribery, that require a high standard of
subjective intent regardless of the corporation’s collective fault—but
237. Kahan, supra note 57, at 621.
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only where the employee was motivated by an intent to benefit her
employer. Generally speaking, the scope-of-employment doctrine has
been understood to limit vicarious liability to cases where torts are
‘“caused’ by the business enterprise.”238 Yet on the tort side, courts
have done more to resolve the potential over- and underinclusiveness
of the doctrine.
1. Unintentional Torts and Overinclusiveness
The potential overinclusiveness of no-fault corporate liability has
been magnified in the criminal context by the proliferation of no-fault
federal criminal offenses. When it comes to tort law, however, the
effects of civil respondeat superior must be read against the
background of general tort law, in which negligence doctrine has
come—to some extent controversially—to replace no-fault liability in
cases of unintentional torts.239 While many scholars have argued that
the boundary between strict liability and negligence is more porous
than conventional wisdom suggests,240 courts generally only overtly
apply strict liability in a couple of contexts, such as strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities (“SLADA”) and products liability.241
Historically, the common law has justified the predominance of
negligence liability through the notion of reciprocity. When a party is
injured by a reasonable risk, he cannot get compensation under a
negligence regime because “[h]e receives his compensation for such
damage[s] by the general good, in which he shares, and the right
238. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 609
(1988).
239. See G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980-2000, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1346–47 (2001).
240. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 217, at 272 (arguing that “some forms of liability
imposed in negligence seem more like strict liability,” including the imposition of liability
under negligence “even when the defendant was not capable of exercising what amounts
to reasonable care,” application of the so-called thin-skull rule for unforeseeably excessive
harm, and the requirement of “perfect compliance with precautionary requirements” in
order to prove reasonable care); Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the
Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1291–92, 1295–96 (1992) (“[The two
doctrines] stand in a ‘nested’ relationship, such that the optimal care inquiry both
incorporates and adds to the cheapest cost-avoider inquiry. To determine optimal care, a
court must not only determine the cheapest precautions that would have avoided an
accident, but also whether the cheapest precautions should have been taken. The cheapest
cost-avoider test, by contrast, omits the latter inquiry; the cheapest cost-avoider is liable
regardless of whether the cheapest means of avoiding the accident were in fact optimal”
and thus “will privately make this second cost-benefit analysis—that is, will determine
which accidents are worth avoiding—in order to minimize his or her total liability by
taking optimal care.”).
241. See Gilles, supra note 240, at 1307 n.45.
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which he has to [engage in similarly risky conduct].”242 Implicit in this
notion are the ideas that compensation for one party necessarily
limits the liberty of the other and that negligence strikes a kind of
balance that maintains the greater good. (The contours of which, of
course, are necessarily and perhaps imperfectly defined by jury
determinations of “the reasonable.”)
Mark Geistfeld has argued that the reciprocity principle can also
explain strict liability for SLADA: “Highly significant risks created by
uncommon activities are not reciprocal and do not merge into the
background level of social risk. For these risks, the negligence rule
does not provide an adequate reciprocal benefit for potential
victims.”243 If we apply this reciprocity value to respondeat superior as
a strict liability doctrine, we might say that there is no reciprocity
between a complex entity and its potential victims. In the same way
that most people do not engage in highly dangerous activities and
therefore do not benefit from the reciprocal benefit of having their
own liability bounded by negligence, an injured person is not a
commercial entity with employees and would only in rare cases
reciprocally benefit from a fault limitation on his or her own vicarious
liability.
Yet most of the actual tort claims for which an entity might be
held vicariously liable sound, themselves, in negligence due to the
systemic preference for tolerating “reasonable” risks based upon the
reciprocity principle. Furthermore, even in the “special” cases of
SLADA and products liability, the operation of strict liability has
come to be softened around the edges by negligence doctrine. For
example, with respect to abnormally dangerous activities, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts says that strict liability may be
inapplicable when the high degree of risk can be eliminated by the
exercise of reasonable care.244 In a 1999 study of 100 decisions, Gerald
Boston found that rarely do plaintiffs raise successful SLADA claims,
due to courts determining that “the negligence system can function
effectively in enforcing safety concerns associated with the activity.”245
And with respect to products liability, the Restatement (Third) of

242. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873).
243. Geistfeld, supra note 213, at 616.
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519(2), 520(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(limiting strict liability to “the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous” and listing as a factor in this inquiry the “inability to eliminate the
risk by the exercise of reasonable care”).
245. Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The
Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 599 (1999).
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Torts proposed to resolve the question of what constitutes a “defect”
with reference to whether there exists a safer alternative, the omission
of which was unreasonable, thus shifting even products liability law
away from strict liability and into the field of negligence.246 Thus,
while respondeat superior itself remains a strict liability rule, an
employee must generally have been negligent in order to bind the
employer through unintentional conduct because the backdrop tort
law has—unlike federal criminal law—moved so far away from nofault liability.247
Finally, both strict liability and negligence jurisprudence have
been influenced in ways particularly relevant to respondeat superior
by the concept of “enterprise liability.”248 Enterprise liability rests on
the premise that “(1) an enterprise has superior risk-spreading
capacity compared to victims who would otherwise bear the costs of
accidents, and (2) an enterprise is generally better placed to respond
to the safety incentives created by liability rules than is the party
suffering harm.”249 While George Priest initially identified the theory
to describe the strict-liability origins of products liability,250
subsequent scholarship has demonstrated the influence of enterprise
liability on negligence as well.251 Most notably, Robert Rabin has
argued that, despite its emphasis on risk allocation, enterprise liability
has come to serve not as a mechanism for “enthroning strict liability
as a replacement” for negligence but as a “different way of thinking
246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The
Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 874, 880 (2002) (describing the Restatement (Third)’s functional approach to
“risk/utility balancing” as “a triumph of negligence over strict liability”).
247. It should be noted that while some theorists, such as Weinrib and Abraham,
consider the coexistence of strict liability and negligence in the application of respondeat
superior to be a feature, others consider it a bug. Compare WEINRIB, supra note 219, at
185–87, and Abraham, supra note 217, at 301 (arguing that the negligence standard has
endured so long due, in part, to its aspects of strict liability), with Calabresi, supra note
211, at 545 (noting that enterprise liability cannot explain why tort liability “generally
retains a semi-fault basis” and that “[t]he inconsistenc[ies] between these limitations based
on fault and the philosophy of workmen’s compensation [underlying respondeat superior]
. . . still remains” (footnotes omitted)). Further, Keating has argued that “the whole of
respondeat superior doctrine,” from the perspective of fault theorists, is “an anomalous
special case governed by other principles.” Keating, supra note 221, at 1311.
248. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985)
(reviewing the intellectual history of enterprise liability).
249. Rabin, supra note 223, at 1190.
250. See Priest, supra note 248, at 463–64.
251. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 639–45 (1992).
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about the social function of the tort system—in particular, viewing
tort as a redistributive and regulatory mechanism—that has evolved
independently of doctrinal change.”252
To illustrate this doctrine’s effects on the structure of negligence
law, Rabin points to the 1976 California Supreme Court decision in
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,253 in which the court
held that a therapist had a duty to warn a potential victim of death
threats made by a patient in the course of therapy despite competing
considerations of therapist-patient privilege.254 Rabin points out that
because “therapists are in the business of treating disturbed patients,
some subset of whom have violent propensities,” they are “singularly
positioned to take reasonable steps to warn when this occupational
hazard arises.”255 Rabin argues that this outcome does not turn on a
risk-spreading function, otherwise a dentist or bartender would be
equally liable for warning of overheard risks as they would still be
better situated than the oblivious victim to prevent the harm.256
Rather, the law appears concerned with deterrence “grounded in the
notion of intrinsic occupational risk.”257
Rabin goes on to identify the thread of enterprise liability
throughout negligence law with other examples of professional
liability premised on the foreseeability of particular sorts of harm,
including relaxation of negligence standards in medical malpractice
law and the liability of auditors to foreseeably injured third parties
who rely on misrepresentations about a client’s financial state.258 In
cases involving auditors, Rabin notes that, while some states have
rejected foreseeability of harm as a touchstone of liability, citing the
potentially “crushing liability” possible under such a standard, many
have adopted it for enterprise liability-based reasons.259 In so doing,
for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court asked “[w]hy should an
innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an
accountant’s professional malpractice” and whether “a rule of
foreseeability [would] elevate the cautionary techniques of the
accounting profession.”260
252. Rabin, supra note 223, at 1198.
253. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), superseded by statute, Act of Sept. 17, 1985, ch.
737, 1985 Cal. Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2018)).
254. Id. at 339–40, 346–47.
255. Rabin, supra note 223, at 1200 (footnote omitted).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1200–02.
259. Id. at 1202.
260. Id. at 1203.
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To summarize then, the potential overinclusiveness of the
respondeat superior standard in tort law has been muted by the
simultaneous movement of tort law generally into the field of
negligence. Furthermore, to the extent that the risk-spreading
purpose of respondeat superior has gained traction through the
ideology of enterprise liability, it has taken the form of a
foreseeability analysis. Even in applying negligence standards, courts
have questioned what sorts of risks attendant to the particular
enterprise are foreseeable to the defendant. While controversial as a
potentially harmful expansion of tort liability in cases such as those of
the negligent auditors, the foreseeability standard nonetheless
combines the goal of shifting risk to the beneficiaries of an enterprise
with the check provided by a reasonableness inquiry as to the
objective foreseeability of harm.
2. Intentional Torts and Underinclusiveness
At the other end of the spectrum, the law of respondeat superior
liability for intentional torts has evolved as well. Unlike in criminal
law, in tort cases, courts and commentators have been divided on
whether an employee’s intent to serve his master is a necessary
precondition to vicarious liability.261 Most notably, the frolic and
detour rule excludes from vicarious liability employee conduct
actuated for a purely private purpose.262 Yet the dual-purpose
doctrine allows a master to be liable for a servant’s negligent conduct
even in situations in which the servant’s predominant motive was to
benefit himself.263 And the Restatement (Second) of Agency makes an
exception for torts committed outside the scope of employment
where the master itself has been negligent or reckless.264 Due in part
to the fact that intentional torts do not always serve the master’s

261. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958)
(“Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is . . . too little actuated
by a purpose to serve the master.”), with WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF AGENCY § 87(A) (1964) (“The ultimate question in the minds of the judges is whether
it is just to make the master’s enterprise bear the loss caused by the particular act . . . . It is
just to do this if it can be said rationally that the employment is the primary cause of the
tort.”).
262. 20 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS,
DEFENSES, AND DAMAGES § 95.05[3][a] (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2013) (“If [conduct] is
. . . for a purely private purpose or a ‘frolic’ of the employee’s own, no liability attaches.”
(internal citations omitted)).
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
264. Id. at § 219(2).
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benefit,265 some jurisdictions only rarely recognize an employee’s
intentional torts as the basis for respondeat superior liability.266
Yet in many jurisdictions, the so-called motive test has given way
to the question of how much responsibility an enterprise should take
for injuries that may be typical of its business.267 This thread of
jurisprudence is typified by Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United
States,268 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit famously held the U.S. government liable for the drunken
property damage caused by its sailor on shore leave, despite the
obvious lack of motive to benefit the employer, on the theory that “a
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents
which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities” and the
fact that the sailor’s conduct “was not so ‘unforeseeable’ as to make it
unfair to charge the Government with responsibility.”269 Numerous
other examples of vicarious liability for intentional torts unmotivated
by intent to serve an employer can be found in state law.270
More specifically, civil courts are beginning to hold employers
vicariously liable for the sexual torts of their employees regardless of
motivation to benefit in cases where the plaintiff can allege a
sufficiently close relationship between the harm suffered and the
defendant’s position as an employee. For example, the D.C. Circuit

265. Cf. 2 FLORIDA TORTS § 50.10[4][d][ii] (Matthew Bender rev ed., 2018) (“[I]n the
case of an intentional tort, vicarious liability may be imposed only if the conduct in some
way furthers the interests of the employer or is at least motivated by a purpose to serve
those interests, rather than the employee’s own. . . . [For example, a]n employee who
assaults a person solely because of personal malice is deemed to act outside the scope of
employment. However, when an assault is committed during an attempt to fulfill an
employment-related duty, it is considered to be within the scope of employment.”
(citations omitted)).
266. See, e.g., Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 828 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[U]nder
the North Carolina law of respondeat superior, an intentional tort is ‘rarely considered to
be within the scope of an employee’s employment.’” (quoting Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C.
587, 594, 398 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1990))).
267. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171–72 (2d Cir.
1968) (criticizing the “motive test”).
268. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
269. Id. at 168, 170–72.
270. See, e.g., Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 6, 8 (Cal. 1946) (en banc)
(holding employer liable for actions of carpenter who attacked a coemployee with a
hammer out of frustration), rev’g 166 P.2d 371 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946); Rodgers v.
Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 146, 150, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding the
imposition of vicarious liability against a subcontractor for his employee’s drunken assault
of two of the general contractor’s employees); Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128
N.E. 711, 711 (N.Y. 1920) (holding employer liable under worker’s compensation statute
for eye injury sustained when employee threw an apple at another because the accident
arose “in the course of employment” because such horseplay should be expected).
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held that a jury could impose vicarious liability on a trucking
company for its employee’s rape of a customer due to the fact that the
deliveryman’s “badge of employment” allowed him to get into the
victim’s home.271 Considering a case involving allegations of sexual
abuse by the staff of a psychiatric hospital, the Minnesota Supreme
Court eliminated the “motivation to serve” element, noting that “it
would be a rare situation where a wrongful act would actually further
the employer’s business,” and thus concluded that motivation was
irrelevant to the availability of vicarious liability.272 The Oregon
Supreme Court announced that, in a case of sexual abuse of a minor
by a priest, the question was not whether the sexual assault itself was
in the course of employment but, rather, whether the priest’s conduct
leading up to the assault was in the course of employment.273 The
court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the priest’s
legitimate employment-related actions “were a necessary precursor to
the sexual abuse” and that the sexual assaults therefore “were a direct
outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was within the
scope of [the priest’s] employment.”274 The Ninth Circuit applied the
Oregon rule in holding that a plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that [the
priest] was an employee of the Holy See acting within the ‘scope of
his employment’ under Oregon law” and that the acts come within
the “tortious act exception” to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act.275 The court held that the church could be vicariously liable on
the alleged facts because the plaintiff had “c[o]me to know [the
defendant] as his priest, counselor and spiritual adviser,” and the
priest had “used his ‘position of authority’ to ‘engage in harmful
sexual contact.’”276 Other examples abound.277 Some use the Bushey

271. Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 650–51 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
272. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306,
310–11 (Minn. 1983).
273. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Or. 1999) (quoting Chesterman v.
Barmon, 753 P.2d 404, 406–07 (Or. 1988) (reasoning that vicarious liability may be found
when acts conducted within the scope of employment result in the acts which led to
injury).
274. Id. at 1168.
275. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
276. Id. at 1083.
277. See, e.g., Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 345, 348–50 (Alaska
1990) (holding that a clinic may be held liable under respondeat superior when a therapist
had sexual relations with a patient); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1342,
1349, 1352 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (holding that the city may be vicariously liable when city
police officer raped motorist after placing her under arrest); Samuels v. S. Baptist Hosp.,
594 So. 2d 571, 573–74 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding hospital liable for nursing assistant’s
rape of patient); Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 1295–96 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding the

97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019)

2019]

TORT ANSWERS

825

logic of foreseeability,278 while others turn on a finding that the
employee’s sexual misconduct arose from or was in some way related
to his or her essential duties.279 The Supreme Court has even
commented on the increasingly broad tort liability of employers for
the sexual crimes of employees unmotivated to serve them,
contrasting it with the more parsimonious vicarious liability standard
governing a Title VII claim.280
It should be recognized that these new developments do not
mean that courts now consistently apply vicarious liability to the
sexual torts of employees—far from it. Martha Chamallas, who has
made the most comprehensive scholarly critique of the field, notes
that “tort law gives no crisp answer to the question of whether a
business is vicariously liable for the sexual torts committed by its
employees” and criticizes as “sexual exceptionalism” the fact that
“[m]any courts continue to treat sexual abuse cases as exceptional,
echoing the sentiments of old-fashioned (pre-1970s) criminal laws
that once approached rape and sexual assault as qualitatively
different from other forms of violence.”281
Nonetheless, unlike in criminal law, tort respondeat superior has
at least begun to move away from an intent-to-benefit requirement
that in some jurisdictions had wholly precluded vicarious liability for
intentional torts. This shift to a focus on the relationship between the
tort and the employer’s enterprise demonstrates that courts are
increasingly thinking of respondeat superior as a form of causation.
This focus on the nexus between the harm caused and the employer’s
business could resolve the underinclusiveness issues in criminal
respondeat superior as well.
C.

The Project of Doctrinal Borrowing

Before moving on to consider these tort developments in the
criminal arena, one must first ask: Is it appropriate to do so? This part
began with a consideration of the very different purposes of and
justifications for tort and criminal liability, which may suggest that the

State of Louisiana vicariously liable when National Guard recruiting officer committed
sexual battery during sham physical examinations).
278. See, e.g., Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1350–51.
279. See, e.g., Samuels, 594 So. 2d at 574 (finding that tortious conduct was “reasonably
incidental” to the performance of the nursing assistant’s duties in caring for a “helpless
[patient] in a locked environment”).
280. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 795–96 (1998).
281. Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. U. L.
REV. 133, 135, 137 (2013).
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whole endeavor is flawed. The law of criminal procedure has already
seen a notable example of courts “borrowing” from tort law to create
a new constitutional standard: the importation of the good faith
defense to a constitutional tort claim against a police officer into the
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.282 That move
was controversial insofar as it applied the jurisprudential logic of one
remedy to another with entirely different aims and design: the logic of
a personal defense to a constitutional tort action for damages
recoverable from an individual, applied to a remedy for a criminal
procedural violation to which no individual is personally entitled,
whose cost is borne by the system.283
Jennifer Laurin has noted that the convergence of the good faith
defense between the constitutional tort and constitutional procedural
realms presents the particular problem of simultaneously shutting
down two remedies for the same violation—on occasions that the
officer’s conduct meets the good faith test, the accused can neither get
tort compensation for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
nor have the seized evidence excluded from his trial.284 Laurin
concludes that, to the extent that the case law “facilitates complete
convergence of the good faith exception with immunity doctrine, such
that its culpability test applies across the range of Fourth Amendment
contexts, this new conduct rule will often . . . set the bar lower than
what the Court has held the Constitution itself to require.”285 By
contrast, Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai defend constitutional
borrowing on rule-of-law grounds.286 They say it promotes
“generality, participation, and accountability,” in part by “[c]reating a
shared repertoire of persuasive moves” that will empower citizens
and officials to recognize governing principles.287 Scholars in other
fields have made similar arguments about the values of
transsubstantive borrowing generally.288

282. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 672–73 (2011).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 676.
285. Id. at 740.
286. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV.
459, 462 (2010).
287. Id.
288. See ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 59–61 (2004) (discussing
convergence in international law); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking
Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 293, 306 (2010) (identifying
convergence between European and United States class action regimes).
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In considering the propriety of borrowing from tort
jurisprudence to flesh out a criminal mens rea standard, note that the
proverbial cow is already out of the barn. Respondeat superior has
already been imported into criminal law; what remains is only to
consider whether further recourse to tort law to develop the doctrine
runs into any of the problems attendant to applying a constitutional
tort defense to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Like the
good faith defense, respondeat superior occupies two distinct settings.
In one, the corporation faces criminal punishment, and the public
stands to gain expressive redress for the harms the entity has imposed
and potential deterrence of future similar offenses. In the other, an
individual plaintiff seeks compensation for harms he has personally
suffered at the hands of the corporation’s employees.
But unlike the good faith defense, the question of vicarious
liability does not implicate dual constitutional remedies. Rather, it is a
way for the law to define a party on the same side of the “v.” in
separate criminal and civil matters. The victims of that party’s
violation—the individual defendant and the public—are distinct (even
assuming there are in fact parallel litigations in the first place). Thus,
using the contours of tort jurisprudence to shape a criminal mens rea
standard is not going to doubly limit any one party’s remedies, much
less any party’s constitutional remedies. Indeed, it is likely to serve
the rule-of-law purpose identified by Tebbe and Tsai, given the
current state of affairs in which the power to label a corporation as a
criminal currently rests almost solely in the hands of prosecutors.
That is not to say, however, that we can or should borrow in full cloth.
A workable standard should adapt the developed principles of tort
respondeat superior to a distinctively criminal setting and the
preexisting rules of criminal mens rea.
IV. A NEW STANDARD
The foregoing has shown that a new standard for criminal
respondeat superior, if it is to benefit from the development of the
doctrine in tort, should (1) take into account the differing importance
of risk-spreading as a purpose of liability as between tort and crime,
(2) be tempered by a component of negligence and/or foreseeability,
and (3) replace the intent-to-benefit requirement with a causation
analysis. I have elsewhere stated in passing that my preferred
corporate mens rea standard would limit criminal liability to cases
where a corporation committed criminal negligence; that is, when it
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has “failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
misconduct occurring and take reasonable measures to prevent it.”289
This part expands upon this standard and demonstrates how it would
look in action.
My standard takes as a starting point a negligence-based model,
such as that proposed by Weissman and Newman.290 Yet it seeks to
reduce uncertainty and vagueness for defendants on the one hand and
the moral hazards of a safe harbor on the other by applying the
doctrinal developments from the respondeat superior doctrine in tort.
Specifically, I propose that corporate criminal liability require three
elements: (1) proof that a crime occurred, regardless of whether any
individual employee had the intent to benefit the corporation; (2) an
omission by the corporation to take reasonable steps to prevent the
crime; and (3) proof that the substantial risk of such a crime was
objectively foreseeable given the nature of the employer’s enterprise.
The three proposed elements work together to expand the
corporate liability analysis away from solely what the individual
employee intended and toward the question that more properly
captures corporate harm: What could the entity collectively have
foreseen and prevented its agent from doing in the scope of
employment, such that the crime can be said to have been caused by a
corporate omission? In answering this question, I draw upon several
of the existing proposals for alternative corporate mens rea standards
already discussed but propose a coherent test that improves, rather
than fully supplants, the respondeat superior test.
As I have argued previously, the idea that a collective omission
to take steps to prevent a crime constitutes a valid form of criminal
mens rea runs into some of the same problems posed in the first place
by the very concept of criminal negligence generally.291 In a debate
with H.L.A. Hart, J.W.C. Turner proposed that the basic idea of
criminal, or “gross,” negligence is problematic.292 The concept of
negligence, he argued, requires that a negligent action be inherently
unconscious—a failure to meet a standard rather than an act of will.293
Following this reasoning, negligence cannot, therefore, be mens rea

289. Sheley, supra note 59, at 232.
290. Weissmann with Newman, supra note 14, at 414.
291. Sheley, supra note 59, at 233.
292. See Patrick M. O’Neil, The Moral Blindness of the Positivistic Legal Hermeneutic
and the Non-Proximate Mens Rea in the Law of Criminal Negligence, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 289,
290, 291–92 (1996).
293. Id. at 294, 301.
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because it is inherently unintended.294 By contrast, if an ostensibly
negligent act is done with any awareness of the consequences, it
becomes recklessness, rendering the category of criminal negligence
irrelevant.295 This argument is intellectually akin to the claim that a
corporation cannot unilaterally “intend” its conduct and should
therefore not be subject to the moral condemnation of the criminal
law.
Yet the criminal law routinely recognizes criminal negligence,
albeit controversially. The Model Penal Code defines criminal
negligence as a lack of awareness of “a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element [of an offense] exists or will result from
[the actor’s] conduct” and that the “failure to perceive it” must
represent “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”296
Furthermore, there is a valid theoretical basis for doing so. The idea
of importing a negligence standard into the criminal law is nothing
new; for all the theoretical debate that has surrounded it, it is hard at
work every time someone is prosecuted for criminally negligent
homicide or involuntary manslaughter. And conceptually it is a
relatively easy fit to apply to a corporation as a condition of vicarious
liability.
Patrick O’Neil has described the concept of criminal negligence
as “non-proximate mens rea,” which is
one or more points of choice when the perpetrator either chose
to indulge in the habits of mind which ultimately led to patterns
of negligence or (more likely) chose not to take steps to correct
patterns of negligence or patterns of mental inadvertency
having the potential to lead to acts of negligence.297
So, for example, when someone chooses to become intoxicated and
subsequently kills a person on the drive home, his conscious intent (to
get drunk) may have been temporally removed from the actual actus
reus (the reckless driving resulting in death, which was itself
inadvertent). It is on this basis that the criminal law has no problem
pairing the remote subjective mens rea of intent to drink with the
foreseeable, if inadvertent, actus reus of killing someone while driving
drunk.

294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 292, 301.
Id. at 301.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
O’Neil, supra note 292, at 301.
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The corporate context poses an additional conceptual challenge:
unlike the case of the drunk driver, here, the criminally negligent
state of mind arises from a different legal entity than the actual
perpetrator of the actus reus. Nonetheless, by examining the effects of
corporate omissions according to familiar principles of causation, it is
possible to formulate a test whereby an individual employee’s mens
rea may be more justifiably attributed to recognizably criminal
misconduct of the corporate employer. I propose, in short, that the
rule of respondeat superior is justified where a negligent corporate
omission is a legal cause of the relevant crime.
A. A Crime, Regardless of Intent to Benefit
The standard begins with proof of individual liability, similar to
the existing respondeat superior standard, but with a couple of key
differences. First, the doctrine of collective knowledge—
inconsistently applied under the current regime—makes much more
sense where some form of genuinely corporate fault exists. As
discussed above, scattered knowledge among various employees
would not seem to justify corporate criminal liability on its face where
there would be no way for management to be aware of all of the
disparately held pieces of knowledge. Yet if it can also be shown, as
discussed below, that a substantial risk of this state of affairs would
have been foreseeable to a reasonable person undertaking the
corporation’s business, and that no reasonable steps had been taken
by anyone in the corporation to prevent it, criminal liability can be
justified.
Second, the showing of corporate fault required by the second
and third prongs of the test should eliminate the old requirement that
the offending employee have acted with the intent to benefit the
corporation. We have seen how courts applying respondeat superior
in tort cases have begun to shift away from this understanding of the
doctrine to instead scrutinize the nexus between the employer’s
enterprise and the resulting crime. Where a criminal has used his
status as an employee to commit an offense, if such an offense was
reasonably foreseeable given the employer’s business, respondeat
superior should operate to impose criminal liability.
B.

The Omission of Reasonable Steps to Prevent the Crime

In Part II, I discussed a number of proposals that looked to
preoffense conduct by the corporation in the form of inadequate
practices and procedures that failed to prevent the relevant offense. I
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noted that such proposals have been rightfully criticized for tying
criminal mens rea to conduct other than the actual actus reus—the
specific action of the employee. Yet the focus on preoffense
negligence does at least capture conduct that can be properly termed
“corporate.” Specifically, while it is difficult to formulate a rule
whereby a corporation can be said to have collectively acted, it is
fairly easy to conceive of a collective omission. The question becomes
whether anyone in the corporation had taken reasonable steps to
prevent an offense from occurring.
In a corporation, composed of many actors engaging in
cooperative behavior over extended temporal periods, the collective
failure of any and all corporate actors to prevent substantially
foreseeable criminal misconduct constitutes an identifiable omission
that does not require applying individual states of mind to a corporate
body. Such a collective failure can properly be said to be at least a
but-for cause of the misconduct. It does not require a theory of
collective intent to determine what steps—if taken by anyone in a
corporation—could reasonably have prevented a crime and conclude
that they were taken by no one. And the same concept of
nonproximate mens rea that implicitly justifies criminal negligence
generally also justifies pairing that negligence to the subsequent
criminal misconduct of an employee. Yet but-for causation alone is an
inadequate basis for criminal liability, which brings us to the final
step.
C.

The Objective Foreseeability of the Crime

To result in criminal liability, an omission must not only be a butfor cause of the prohibited harm but also a proximate cause. While
proximate causation is, in and of itself, a topic rife with doctrinal
confusion,298 American courts generally follow the Model Penal Code
in cases of criminal negligence and require that the prohibited harm
be foreseeable to the wrongdoer.299 So, for example, if my taxi driver
298. See generally Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293
(2002) (analyzing the history of proximate causation in the civil system).
299. See, e.g., United States v. Lee Peng Fei, 225 F.3d 167, 168–69, 171 (2d Cir. 2000)
(affirming the manslaughter conviction for the deaths of six undocumented immigrants
over a challenge on causation grounds because, “regardless of whether the beach was
sandy or rocky at the point of impact, the multiple deaths that in fact occurred were an
entirely foreseeable result of [the defendant’s] arrangements and orders to his
subordinates”); United States v. Main, 113 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1997) (asserting that
involuntary manslaughter should only be imposed when death was “within the risk
foreseeably created by the [defendant’s] conduct”); United States v. Escamilla, 467 F.2d
341, 346 (4th Cir. 1972) (observing that “awareness of the tendency to danger, or the
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fails to pick me up on time and I am forced to take a later flight,
which crashes, he is indeed a but-for cause of my death, but as my
death is not a foreseeable result of his omission, he cannot be said to
be a proximate cause of it. In other words, when dealing with the
criminal negligence of individuals, courts already apply the same
analysis from tort enterprise liability cases: they consider what harms
are foreseeable given the activity engaged in. The requirement that
the harm be substantially foreseeable, a requirement of the Model
Penal Code and the states that follow it, recognizes the heightened
degree of negligence necessary to rise to the level of criminal, rather
than merely tortious, conduct.
Thus, for a collective omission by a corporation to prevent a
crime from occurring to meet the standard required to show
proximate causation in criminal negligence, there must be a
substantially foreseeable risk of a particular crime occurring. This
begs the question: Foreseeable to whom? William Laufer’s
proposal—that we ask what state of mind a reasonable corporation
under similar circumstances would have had with respect to a
particular crime—sought to introduce a welcome element of objective
analysis into the inquiry.300 Yet, as mentioned previously, that
proposal has been criticized for leaving unresolved the question of
what a “reasonable corporation” is in the first place.301 While
determining whether the risk of a particular crime is foreseeable may
be less complex than Laufer’s proposal, which requires measuring the
full gamut of states of mind against that of a reasonable corporation,
it is clear that even the narrower question of objective foreseeability
involves reference to a baseline reasonable corporation.
Tort law again provides us with useful guidance here. When the
question is simply whether a risk is foreseeable in determining
whether an individual has been negligent, the prevailing analysis
involves the dangers inherent in the underlying risky activity and the
circumstances that surround it.302 The law does not ask whether a
foreseeability of injury, from the act or omission is an indispensable element of
negligence” (first citing Copeland v. State, 285 S.W. 565, 566 (Tenn. 1926); and then citing
State v. Tankersley, 172 N.C. 955, 959–60, 90 S.E. 781, 783 (1916)).
300. Laufer, supra note 12, at 676–78, 701.
301. Diamantis, supra note 74, at 2074 (“To apply [Laufer’s] test for corporate mens
rea, courts must already known what mental states an average corporation would have in
various circumstances.”).
302. See Fowler Vincent Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts, 7
NOTRE DAME LAW. 468, 468–70 (1932) (“The whole idea of risk or threat is
comprehended in the notion of foresight—foresight in the sense of the probability of harm
resulting from conduct. Experience suggests the danger incident to certain activity. Not
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tortfeasor took the steps that he personally should have but rather
whether his conduct met the standard of a reasonably prudent actor
according to an “aggregate community measure.”303 While physical
disability may be taken into account when measuring a tortfeasor’s
conduct,304 the individualized mental characteristics of the defendant
do not generally change the analysis unless the defendant is a child.305
It is unclear why the corporate nature of the defendant should be
any more relevant than the specific mental characteristics of an
individual in determining whether a risk was objectively foreseeable.
The question of whether there is a substantially foreseeable risk of an
employee, acting within the scope of his or her employment,
committing a crime is simple: Would a reasonable person,
undertaking the same potentially risky enterprise as a corporation,
have perceived the risk? Because the question of foreseeability is
objective, it may not be necessary to look into the actual knowledge
of individual constituents of a corporation to determine whose mental
state should govern. The question of whether a risk is foreseeable
attaches to the act itself and the degree of care desired from an
individual undertaking it—whether the activity is running a factory or
controlling the medical care of prepubescent girls.
Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Torts takes into consideration
the specialized skills of a tortfeasors in its negligence analysis: “If an
actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most
others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into
account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a
reasonably careful person.”306 Doctors are the most obvious example
of defendants held to a heightened standard of care; some
jurisdictions have also applied it to architects, physical therapists,
engineers, and construction workers.307 How to attribute a
corporation’s employees’ collective knowledge and skills to the entity
itself for the purposes of determining whether a risk is objectively

particular experience of particular individuals, but general experience—experience that
often defies analysis—the multitude of factors, knowledge, hunches, instincts or what they
may be called, the common sense that makes social intercourse possible, all operate to
prompt the ‘ordinary reasonable man’ that harms are ‘probable’ or ‘natural’ as normal
results of certain situations and certain conduct.”)
303. Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 627, 636–37 (2016).
304. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 11(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
305. Id. § 11(c).
306. Id. § 12.
307. Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 303, at 641–42.
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foreseeable would prove to be the trickiest part of this proposed
standard. Yet to do business in nearly any sector a corporation must,
as an entity, meet a myriad of licensing and certification standards. It
does not require particularly elaborate mental gymnastics to ask what
standard of care a reasonable person with the expertise required to
meet those standards would adhere to in evaluating criminal risk
associated with those areas of expertise. Doing so is entirely
consistent with the philosophy of enterprise liability that has
grounded respondeat superior in tort cases.
D. Examples
To understand how this new, tort-based rule would apply in
practice, consider the following six hypothetical scenarios.
1. The Rogue Bid Rigger
ABC Corporation is a government contractor doing business
across the country. It has strong compliance programs in place to
prevent its contracting officers from rigging bids for government
contracts in violation of the Sherman Act.308 An individual officer is
approached by his counterpart at DEF Corporation who proposes a
scheme whereby ABC and DEF will coordinate bids for two
upcoming construction contracts with the City of Toledo, allowing
each of them to submit the lowest bid on one project. The ABC
officer agrees. Here, the first and third prongs of the test are met: bid
rigging is a crime, the substantial risk of which is foreseeable by
anyone who undertakes a government contracting enterprise, and the
crime occurred, the officer committed the actus reus of Sherman Act
§ 1, with the requisite mens rea insofar as he knowingly entered an
anticompetitive conspiracy.309 The corporation would need to make a
defense based upon its having taken all reasonable steps to prevent
the crime. The evidentiary inquiry should not be simply whether a
compliance program existed but how it operated in the specific
circumstances.

308. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
309. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435, 443–46 (1978)
(construing § 1 of the Sherman Act and concluding that “the perpetrator’s knowledge of
the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent”).
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2. Collective Fault
A bank has failed to report cash transfers greater than $10,000 in
violation of the CTRA.310 The facts are identical to those of the Bank
of New England case described above: multiple employees cashed
checks to the same customer that added up to a sum greater than
$10,000.311 Liability under the CTRA requires “proof of the
defendant’s knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific
intent to commit the crime.”312 Assigning culpability to the employer
would require a bit more than simply tallying the knowledge of the
group, as the court did in that case. The question would be whether
the multiple-transaction scenario was substantially foreseeable and
whether the bank had taken reasonable steps to prevent it. Given the
commonplace nature of the problem, the answers to these questions
appear to be yes and no, respectively. This analysis again borrows
from the structure of respondeat superior in the tort context. There
may be cases where intentional torts cannot be vicariously imputed
against an employer due to the frolic-and-detour principle. Yet direct
liability for negligent hiring or entrustment may exist where the
employer failed to exercise due care in giving responsibility to a
particular employee and that employee committed a tort.313 Here, one
could say that the employer’s negligence in allowing uncoordinated
receipt of funds caused the foreseeable harm of these transactions. At
that point, and only at that point, does it makes sense to impute all of
the employees’ disparate knowledge to the employer.
3. The Sexually Abusive Doctor
USA Gymnastics employed a doctor who repeatedly molested
the little girls in his care. The evidence suggests that the organization
routinely ignored complaints about his behavior and allowed him to
continue in his role for years. The sexual abuse of vulnerable children
by a doctor tasked with the care of particularly intimate sorts of
medical problems is reasonably foreseeable by someone undertaking
to run an athletic organization that will largely shape the health and
lives of its participants throughout their childhoods and adolescence.
(It would be far less foreseeable in a situation involving less physical
intimacy and/or a lesser degree of control by the employee over the

310. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5322 (2012); supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
312. United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1580 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984)).
313. See, e.g., Henderson v. Prof’l Coatings Corp., 819 P.2d 84, 90–92 (Haw. 1991).
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child.) The crime occurred and USA Gymnastics appears to have
taken few, if any, reasonable steps to prevent it or even to act upon
the subjective awareness of irregularities by many of its employees.
USA Gymnastics would be criminally liable. This hypothetical also
provides a good opportunity to consider the role of subjective
knowledge held by individual employees within this standard. The
benefit of the foreseeability prong of my test is that it creates an
objective standard that avoids philosophical conundrums about
corporate subjectivity. Yet actual subjective knowledge held by
individual employees becomes relevant, instead, at the second prong:
it is very hard for a corporation to argue that its omission of
reasonable steps did not cause the crime where its procedures were
insufficient to receive and adequately respond to this information
received by its employees. Subjective knowledge has evidentiary
value on the question of whether an unreasonable omission occurred.
4. The Unforeseeable Offense
A Seattle-based armored truck driver is loading a multimilliondollar transport load from a bank in downtown Seattle. During the
tense process of getting the money into the truck, a particularly
aggressive Canada goose descends from the heavens and begins
attacking him. While the driver is in no actual danger, he cannot pick
up the safes he is moving without the goose biting his hands. He
draws his work-issued pistol and shoots the bird dead, in violation of
the Migratory Bird Treaty (“MBT”).314 While this action was clearly
within the scope of employment, the employer would be able to argue
that the death of a protected bird was not a substantially foreseeable
crime from the perspective of a reasonable operator of an armored
truck company.
5. Corporate Homicide
Take the facts of another earlier-mentioned case, WarnerLambert, where six of the defendant-gum-manufacturer’s employees
died after magnesium stearate accumulated on the plant’s machines
and in the air, causing an explosion.315 In that case the court held that,
314. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012). The MBT requires a deliberate action resulting in
the death of a protected bird, so the elements are met vis-à-vis the employee’s intentional
shooting of the goose. See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89
(5th Cir. 2015) (explaining that, for the purposes of the MBT, “a ‘taking’ is limited to
deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds”).
315. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 662 (N.Y. 1980); see also supra
note 195 and accompanying text.
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because the corporate defendant was aware only of a “broad,
undifferentiated risk of an explosion,” it could not be held liable as
the particular pathway through which the explosion occurred was
unforeseeable.316 Without getting too deep into the chemistry of
magnesium stearate, assume for simplicity’s sake that an explosion
occurred because one employee nonnegligently left dust of the
compound on a machine and the other did something to render it
airborne. The second employee’s action would not have been
negligent had the compound, of which he was reasonably unaware,
not been there. Like the knowledge of the bank employees in
hypothetical #2, we can aggregate the conduct of the two employees
into one criminally negligent transaction resulting in death
(involuntary manslaughter), meeting the first prong of my test. The
next question is whether the crime objectively substantially
foreseeable. We know from the facts that the corporation was aware
of the risk of explosion, so the question of whether a reasonable
person engaging in the gum-manufacturing business would be aware
of the substantial risk of involuntary manslaughter can probably be
answered in the affirmative.317 The final question is whether anyone in
the corporation took reasonable steps to prevent this sort of
explosion. The corporation could use its evidence on how the
particular pathway to explosion was unforeseeable to argue that there
were no reasonable steps it could have taken to prevent it. But the
government would then be free to argue that, particularly given the
generalized risk of explosion, the manufacturer should have taken
more steps to determine unknown unknowns and that this particular
pathway was reasonably discoverable.
6. The Deliveryman Rapist
The final example comes from one of the tort cases referenced
above, in which the court found the employer liable when its truck
driver raped a woman to whom he made a delivery. In this case we
would, again, ask whether a substantial risk of the crime was
objectively foreseeable. Without more facts, arguably not. Unlike a
team doctor with repeated, unsupervised access to little girls, a
deliveryman has limited access to and intimacy with his employer’s
clients. Similarly, the government would have difficulty proving lack
of reasonable steps (barring readily discoverable information that the
316. Id. at 661, 665–66.
317. Note that this analysis turns on whether a particular crime is foreseeable without
reference to the particular logical pathway.
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particular truck driver is a violent sex offender). Unlike USA
Gymnastics, which had the same group of gymnasts in its care for
many years and could reasonably have had far better reporting
mechanisms in place, it would basically require an armed escort to
police every deliveryman’s one-off interaction with every mail
recipient to prevent this particular harm. This would likely be a case
where the removal of the intent-to-benefit requirement would not
render the employer liable for the sexual assault.
E.

Counterarguments

There are two obvious potential objections to my proposal, one
arguing that it will overly reduce corporate criminal liability and the
other that it will burdensomely expand it. Both raise the basic
problem inherent in any standard that turns on reasonableness and
foreseeability. Such standards rely on jury decisionmaking (or at least
the threat of jury decisionmaking) around the question of what
constitutes reasonableness. And all such standards run the risk of socalled hindsight bias, where a risk seems more foreseeable after it has
occurred in fact.318 On one level, the critiques are valid; there is no
more escaping those problems in the context of corporate criminal
mens rea than in any other area of the law in which negligence
standards carry weight. Considering both of these concerns together,
however, gives reason to hope that the balance created by this
standard will nonetheless be a substantial improvement over the
status quo.
The argument that removing pure strict liability from criminal
respondeat superior would underpunish corporations says that to do
so would allow corporations to waste enforcement resources by
increasingly taking cases to trial and presenting complicated evidence
about best practices in order to confuse juries. The argument that
removing the intent-to-benefit requirement in favor of a causation
analysis premised on foreseeability would overpunish says that
corporations would be on the hook for all of the intentional torts
committed in fact by their employees, based on an irrational view of
foreseeability driven by hindsight bias.
The underpunishment critique is valid to a point. Deep-pocketed
corporations could and would hire experts to defend their practices
318. See Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the
Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 502 (1996); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently
Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions
Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1394 (2006) (examining how hindsight bias impacts the
nonobviousness determination in patent cases).
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and procedures and to attest to the unforeseeability of particular
events. In cases where shades of grey exist, it would be harder for the
government to get a conviction than under the status quo where they
have no obligation to show institutional fault and can, thus, more
easily attain a plea or a deferred prosecution agreement. The
response is that it is not clear that this is a bad thing. In the first place,
evidence suggests that juries generally make the same determinations
of negligence as judges considering the same facts.319 Even if there
were fewer prosecutions than in a world without trials—a world
which is hardly desirable320—there is no reason to believe that there
would be a rash of actually culpable corporations getting a pass. The
opposing position might counter that any theory should not worry
about limiting corporate liability to the genuinely culpable; instead
the theory should prioritize the deterrent power of allowing
prosecutors to reach the corporate employer in all cases. Yet, by
removing the intent-to-benefit requirement, my proposal gives
prosecutors, in exchange for a tougher row to hoe in ambiguous cases,
more enforcement bang for their buck in cases likely to be of higher
profile and greatest expressive (and, thus, potentially deterrent)
value. In their public statements, relatives of victims who perish due
to corporate negligence routinely mention the lack of criminal
punishment for the corporation as particularly outrageous.321 Under
319. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–64 (1966)
(“[O]ver-all agreement on liability of 78 per cent [sic].”); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia
Jury and Negligence: The View from the Trenches, 28 GA. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (1993)
(discussing findings of the trial bar’s perceptions of the jury’s objectivity, obedience to law,
and capacity for comprehension).
320. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2467–68 (2004) (arguing that uncertainty, money, self-interest, and
demographic variation greatly influence plea bargains, such that they do not capture the
outcomes that might expected at trial). See generally LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING
THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2015) (detailing the various
challenges created by the justice system’s failure to integrate the community’s voice in the
form of jury trials).
321. See, e.g., Legal Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of Keith D.
Jones) (“Transocean, Halliburton, and any other company will be back because they have
the infrastructure and economic might to make more money. But Gordon will never be
back. Never. And neither will the 10 good men who died with him.”); THE BUFFALO
CREEK FLOOD: AN ACT OF MAN TRANSCRIPT 5, http://www.buffalocreekflood.org/
media/BCF-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M3Z-DN8F] (“We think that this coal
company, Pittston, has murdered the people, and we call upon the prosecuting attorney
and the judge . . . to prosecute and bring to trial this coal company . . . .” (statement of
statement of the Citizens’ Commission)); id. (“[T]he fact of the matter is that these are all
laws on the books which the company felt completely free to ignore, which says something
about the relationships between coal companies and state governments . . . just this
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my proposal, prosecutors would get a wider range of tools to pursue
corporations for crimes of particularly high public interest, such as
involuntary manslaughter, which is a beneficial trade off.
The overpunishment position is more easily dealt with. If there
indeed exists a hindsight bias around the question of foreseeability, it
would still result in fewer convictions of faultless corporations than in
the current world, where the foreseeability of harm need not be
proven at all! While the removal of the intent-to-benefit requirement
could pose a danger of hindsight bias, leading to irrational liability in
the fairly narrow category of cases involving intentional crimes, like
sexual assault, it would greatly improve the chances of actually
innocent corporations in the far, far broader swath of prosecutions
involving the myriad strict liability offenses in the Federal Code.
Negligence-based tests are imperfect but far better for innocent
corporations than respondeat superior, where the after-the-fact
distortions come not from the cognitive biases of jurors but the varied
motivations of prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have demonstrated how common law tort
doctrines can be used to refine what remains a purely common law
rule of criminal respondeat superior. Background tort developments
around foreseeability and negligence as the touchstones for enterprise
liability and the replacement of the intent-to-benefit requirement
with a causation analysis shed light on the problems of over- and
underinclusiveness on the criminal side. Therefore, the common law
already contains the tools courts need to refine the poorly developed
New York Central standard and resolve many of its sins in the modern
enforcement era. There are obvious procedural challenges to a
comprehensive judicial solution, most significantly that an elaborate
redefinition of a criminal standard—particularly when it expands
liability, as it would in some cases—creates a kind of ex post facto
situation, or at least a stare decisis issue. Common law change would
need to be extremely gradual to avoid these problems.
That said, this Article opened with the observation that mens rea
for regulatory and white-collar offenses has become an important
enough political flashpoint as to have exploded a hard-won bipartisan
coalition for criminal justice reform. While it is unlikely that my
proposal on the specific issue of corporate criminal mens rea will fully
complete freedom to ignore these laws with no fear of any kind of prosecution.”
(statement of Thomas N. Bethell)).
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please either side in that debate, it does contain a bit of something for
everyone, which would make it a viable legislative fix in the absence
of judicial intervention. Proponents of mens rea reform will argue
that, even if we eliminate pure respondeat superior, individual
defendants will nonetheless remain subject to the wide range of
federal strict liability offenses. Critics of mens rea reform will argue
that, due to the challenges inherent in prosecuting complex criminal
offenses, requiring prosecutors to show any kind of corporate fault
will reduce the number of successful white-collar prosecutions.
Both objections are correct. Yet under this rule, reform
proponents would certainly see some reduction in no-fault
prosecutions and less uncertainty for commercial actors. And
opponents would still see negligent corporations punished and an
increase in corporate liability for the most egregious crimes of
violence. Furthermore, unlike many sudden, broad-sweeping
statutory revisions322—and like most state criminal codes—this
proposal benefits from common law development. If the Supreme
Court remains silent for another century on the question of whitecollar mens rea, the moment seems uniquely right for legislative
intervention.

322. This includes the original proposal for mens rea reform, which suffered from
many logical uncertainties when read in the context of the rest of the federal criminal
code. See Orin Kerr, A Confusing Proposal to Reform the ‘Mens Rea’ of Federal Criminal
Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/11/25/a-confusing-proposal-to-reform-the-mens-rea-of-federal-criminallaw/?utm_term=.e9a13ad80298 [https://perma.cc/X5P6-ALD6 (dark archive)] (pointing out
numerous drafting problems, including that it was unclear whether the new “willfulness”
requirement would have been triggered only if no element of an offense stipulated a mens
rea element or if any single element lacked one).
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